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MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF CONTRACTING PARTIES-
LOUISIANA LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE
George L. Bilbe*
The terms "mistaken assumption" and "misunderstanding" are being
used with increasing frequency in endeavor to identify categories in the
American law of mistake.' Generally, mistaken assumption is used in
describing a situation in which contracting parties mutually understand
every provision they have made express but one or both are mistaken
as to circumstances existing at the time their agreement is made.' Mis-
understanding, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which the par-
ties have significantly different perceptions concerning the contractual com-
mitments or other legal consequences to result from their communica-
tions. 3 In the Louisiana Civil Code, both of these situations' are classified
as instances of error," but further classification and a consideration of
a surprisingly large number of Code articles may be necessary in the resolu-
tion of particular problems.5 The Louisiana appellate courts also regard
mistaken assumptions and misunderstandings as instances of error and
generally address both situations in terms of. a Code-based concept of
"error as to principal cause." 6 This article considers the Code articles
and the jurisprudence concerning these topics. This task is undertaken
with an awareness that the pertinent Code articles probably will be repealed
and replaced by enactment of the Louisiana State Law Institute's pro-
posal for revision of the Code's obligations title.7 However, the proposed
legislation concerning error, in the language of the project's reporter,'
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1. See, e.g., G. PALMIER, MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1962); Palmer, The Effect
of Misunderstanding on Contract Formation and Reformation Under the Restatement of
Contracts Second, 65 MICH. L. REv. 33 (1966); Rabin, A Proposed Black-Letter Rule Con-
cerning Mistaken Assumptions in Bargain Transactions, 45 TEx. L. REv. 1273 (1967).
2. See 0. PALMER, supra note 1; Rabin, supra note 1.
3. See generally G. PALMER, supra note 1; Palmer, supra note 1.
4. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1823, 1841. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1797-1846.
5. In addition to the articles identified supra note 4, other Civil Code articles may
play a significant role in the resolution of particular problems. A significant number of
these articles are identified infra notes 72-75.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77.
7. The Louisiana State Law Institute's proposal was introduced as House Bill 746
of the 1983 Regular Session. Action on the bill was deferred pending its study by a joint
subcommittee composed of certain members of the House Civil Law and Procedure Com-
mittee and the Senate Judiciary "A" Committee. 1 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 9th Reg. Sess. at 294, 334 (Apr. 29, 1983).
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would not significantly "change the law," 9 and thus, at least the existing
jurisprudence, if not also the present legislation, should retain significance
if the proposal is enacted.
THE CIVIL CODE ARTICLES CONCERNING ERROR
The largest number of the Code articles concerning the significance
of error are found in the title, "Of Conventional Obligations," under
the section heading, "Of the Consent Necessary to Give Validity to a
Contract." Civil Code article 18190 provides that an expression of con-
sent does not constitute the consent requisite to contractual commitment
"where it has been produced by-[error." Civil Code article 1823 ad-
dresses the identification of errors having this vitiating effect:
Errors may exist as to all the circumstances and facts which
relate to a contract, but it is not every error that will invalidate
it. To have that effect, the error must be in some point, which
was a principal cause for making the contract, and it may be either
as to the motive for making the contract, to the person with whom
it is made, or to the subject matter of the contract itself.'
The Code then considers separately the categories of error thus identified.
Error in the motive' 2 and error as to the person are treated through
definition and examples. Next, the category named error as to the subject
matter in article 1823 is treated under the heading, "Of Error as to the
Nature and Object of the Contract." Here, the Code first refers to the
situation where parties contemplate different generic contracts and classifies
it as error "as to the nature of the contract.'"' Next, error as to the
9. In House Bill 746 of the 1983 Regular Session, the principal error provisions are
found in proposed articles 1948-1952. The statement concerning the impact of the enact-
ment of these provisions is found in the comments to Civil Code articles 1950 and 1951.
However, some change would be effected by enactment of article 1952.
10. Article 1819 provides:
Consent being the concurrence of intention in two or more persons, with regard
to a matter understood by all, reciprocally communicated, and resulting in each
party from a free and deliberate exercise of the will, it follows that there is no
consent, not only where the intent has not been mutually communicated or im-






11. The French text of article 1817 of the Civil Code of 1825, the counterpart of pre-
sent Civil Code article 1823, contains no language corresponding to the reference in the
English text to "the motive for making the contract." The addition, however, is consistent
with the Civil Code's recognition of the category of error as to motive.
12. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1824-1833.
13. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1834-1840.
14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1841.
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"substance" 5 of an object is identified as an instance warranting rescis-
sion, and error as to the "substantial quality" 6 of an object is also iden-
tified as an occurrence justifying relief. Finally, rescission is provided for
in case of "[e]rror as to the other qualities of the object" when those
qualities are "the principal cause of making the contract." 7 The Code
next addresses "errors of law"" and, consistent with article 1823's ex-
pression, limits rescission to situations where such error was the "only
or principal cause" of the agreement.
These rather elaborate articles were first enacted in the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825. The Louisiana Civil Code or Digest of 1808, borrowing
the approach of the French Civil Code, contained only a handful of ar-
ticles addressing error as a concept applicable to contractual commitments
in general.' 9 Most of the articles added in 1825 can be traced readily to
the commentaries of Toullier ° in his treatise concerning the French Civil
Code. His influence is clearly apparent in the Code articles concerning
error "in the motive."
Error in the Motive
The first four articles of this category are particularly important. Civil
Code articles 1824 and 1825,21 along with other Code articles,22 show that
the Louisiana Civil Code, like Toullier, equates cause and motive and
15. Civil Code articles 1842-1845 are quoted infra text accompanying notes 52-55.
16. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1842, 1844.
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1845.
18. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 1846.
19. The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 contained the following provisions regarding error:
"That is no valid consent that is given through error, or is extorted by violence or surprised
by fraud." LA. DIOEST OF 1808 bk. Ill, tit. Ill, art. 9.
Error is a cause of nullity in an agreement, only when it falls on the very
substance of the thing that is the object of it.
It is not a cause of nullity, when it falls only on the person with whom one
intended to contract, unless the consideration of that person be the principal cause
of the agreement.
Id. art. 10. "An obligation without a cause, or with a false or unlawful cause, can have
no effect." Id. art. 23. These provisions are expressed in the language of the significant
error provisions of the French Civil Code. See FRENCH CIv. CODE arts. 1109-1110, 1131,
respectively.
20. C. TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, SUIVANT L'ORDRE Du CODE (Nouvelle
dd. Augment'e en Belgique, Bruxelles 1837).
21. Article 1824 provides:
The reality of the cause is a kind of precedent condition to the contract, without
which the consent would not have been given, because the motive being that which
determines the will, if there be no such cause where one was supposed to exist,
or if it be falsely represented, there can be no valid consent.
Article 1825 provides: "The error in the cause of a contract to have the effect of invalidating
it, must be on the principal cause, when there are several; this principal cause is called
the motive, and means that consideration without which the contract would not have been
made."
22. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1823, 1896.
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links the concept with error. Cause, in the language of Civil Code article
1896, is "the consideration or motive" for incurring an obligation.2" In
Toullier's words, cause is "the motive" that induces the making of the
obligation, the "reason why it is made." 2 Similarly, when article 18242"
describes the "reality of the cause" as a "kind of precedent condition
to the contract," it refers to the accuracy of an assumption upon which
the enforceability of an agreement will depend. Article 182526 addresses
the identification of such significant assumptions and provides that rescis-
sion is limited to situations in which error concerns the principal cause
or motive.27 Civil Code article 1826 expresses the additional requirement
often emphasized in the Louisiana jurisprudence: "No error in the motive
can invalidate a contract, unless the other party was apprised that it was
the principal cause of the agreement, or unless from the nature of the
transaction it must be presumed that he knew it." Civil Code article 1827
emphasizes that a motive can have this "apparent" quality without having
been made "an express condition" of an agreement.28 The remaining ar-
ticles provide examples designed to illustrate the concept.
Civil Code article 1828 concerns an heir's agreement to pay a party
who has sued him on an instrument thought to have been executed by
his ancestor.29 The agreement is said to be void if the instrument is forged.
Thus, the Code assumes that the heir who pays such a debt normally
would regard genuineness as a matter of certainty and would not regard
himself to be taking chances as to the matter. This assumption of
23. Civil Code article 1896 provides:
By the cause of the contract, in this section, is meant the consideration or motive
for making it; and a contract is said to be without a cause, whenever the party
was in error, supposing that which was his inducement for contracting to exist,
when in fact it had never existed, or had ceased to exist before the contract was
made.
24. 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20, no. 166, at 298-99; see also I S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGA-
TIONS § 212 in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 376-81 (1969).
25. See supra note 21.
26. See supra note 21.
27. The French text of article 1819 of the Civil Code of 1825, the counterpart of pre-
sent Civil Code article 1825, did not utilize the term "motive" in its definition of principal
cause. It read: "Pour que l'erreur sur la cause empeche le contrat d'Otre valide, il faut
que cette cause soit la principale, lorsqu'il y en a plusieurs. Cette principale cause est celle
sans laquelle le contrat n'aurait pas Oto fait."
28. Article 1827 provides:
But wherever the motive is apparent, although not made an express condition,
if the error bears on that motive, the contract is void. A promise to give a certain
sum to bear the expenses of a marriage, which the party supposes to have taken
place, is not obligatory, if there be no marriage.
29. Article 1828 reads:
Thus, too, if a suit be brought on an obligation purporting to have been made
by the ancestor of the defendant, and, supposing it to be true, the defendant
enters into a compromise or promise to pay, the compromise or promise is void,
if it should be afterwards discovered that the obligation was forged.
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genuineness, although unexpressed, is nonetheless "apparent" in article
1827's sense, and it is identified as the heir's principal cause.
Civil Code article 1829 provides that the compromise of a suit is null
if, unbeknown to the parties, the suit has been "finally decided" at the
time the compromise is made.30 A suit is then said to be "finally de-
cided" only when it is not subject "to appeal or revision." In the situa-
tion contemplated by the Code, the principal cause is putting an end to
a dispute not yet conclusively resolved by the judicial process. Thus, a
party who asserts that he would not have entered the agreement if he
had been aware of the rendition of an appealable judgment does not
register an actionable complaint. Such an assumption is not regarded as
sufficiently fundamental or apparent so that the other party should under-
stand the agreement to be conditioned upon the assumption's accuracy.
Situations may arise, however, where the assumption that there has been
no lower court judgment should be identified as a principal cause. In
considering such a possibility, articles under the Code title, "Of Trans-
action or Compromise," also should be examined.3 1 In any event, article
1829 uses the concept of principal cause to explain a risk allocation re-
quiring a mistaken party to live with the terms of an agreement.
Civil Code article 183032 addresses a situation-very similar to the one
described in article 1828. However, in this case the document prompting
the agreement is misleading not because it is forged but because its disposi-
tions have been superseded or its obligations have been extinguished. In
Toullier's example, an heir and a supposed legatee reach agreement con-
cerning a legacy contained in a testament which has been revoked by a
second instrument. 3 In the Code's view, the heir's principal cause is to
settle matters with a person to whom the deceased intended to make a
legacy. Thus, the heir is seen as having dealt in certainties and not to
have been taking chances as to the possibility of revocation. In this regard,
Louisiana Civil Code article 1831 is of particular interest as it recognizes
that an agreement intended to put an end to "all differences generally" 3 '
30. Article 1829 reads:
In the same manner a compromise of a suit and any obligation made in conse-
quence of it, is void, if, at the time, but unknown to the parties, the suit be
finally decided. But if the decision be not final, but subject to appeal or revision,
the compromise is valid.
31. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 3071-3083.
32. Article 1830 provides: "A compromise also is void, where one of the parties is
ignorant of the existence of a paper, which, being afterwards discovered, shows that the
other had no right, and this, whether the other party knew the existence of the paper or not."
33. 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20, no. 45, at 263.
34. Civil Code article 1831 provides:
But if the compromise be of all differences generally, and there were other
subjects of dispute, besides that in which the error existed, of sufficient impor-
tance to raise a presumption that, even if the error had been discovered, the com-
promise would still have been made, then such error shall not invalidate the
contract.
19841
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
implies willingness to take some risk as to the accuracy of the informa-
tion concerning the matters in dispute. Reference to Toullier again proves
helpful." All of Toullier's examples of error in motive in compromise
are based upon the French Civil Code articles regulating such agreements.
Thus, in the passage in question, he is attempting to explain the provi-
sion of French Civil Code article 2057 in terms of his concept of motive.
This article, the source of present Louisiana Civil Code article 3083,36
literally forecloses rescission based upon subsequently discovered documents
in the case of a compromise of all affairs or differences. Thus, the prin-
cipal cause contemplated by French Civil Code article 2057 and Loui-
siana Civil Code article 3083 is to achieve final settlement of a number
of disputes in light of present information about them.
Finally, Louisiana Civil Code article 1833 treats the situation in which
insurance is procured on an item that previously has been destroyed and
the situation in which an annuity is purchased for a duration measured
by the life of a person who previously has died.' In both cases error
as to the principal cause is found. In the language of the article, an agree-
ment to take such chances must be "express."
Thus, in each of the Code's examples of error as to the motive, the
framers seek to explain their solution in terms of assumptions upon which
it was believed that parties would be proceeding in the absence of factors
indicating a contrary understanding. In situations in which statutes do
not prescribe an outcome, a similar inquiry is equally in order.
Error as to the Person
The Code articles concerning "Error as to the Person"" are clearly
35. 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20, no. 45, at 263.
36. Article 3083 provides:
When parties have compromised generally on all the differences, which they
might have had with one another, the titles which they then know nothing of
and which were afterwards discovered, are not a cause of rescinding the trans-
action, unless they have been kept concealed on purpose by the deed of one of
the parties.
But the transaction becomes void, if it relates only to an object upon which
it is proved by the titles newly discovered, that one of the parties has no right at all.
37. Article 1833 reads:
Error in the motive also is shown in the case either of an insurance on property
or an annuity on lives. If the property be lost, or the life be at an end, at the
time of making the contract, there is no obligation, unless, in the case of the
insurance, it be expressly stipulated that the insurer takes the risk of those events,
from a period prior to the contract. If the same express stipulation takes place
in the case of the annuity, it then becomes an insurance, and is valid for the
same reason.
38. Civil Code articles 1834-1838 are the most significant of these provisions. Article
1834 provides: "Error as to the person, with whom the contract is made, will invalidate
it, if the consideration of the person is the principal or only cause of the contract, as it
always is in the contract of marriage." Article 1835 provides: "In contracts of beneficence,
the consideration of the person is presumed by law to be the principal cause."
[Vol. 44
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patterned upon Toullier's discussion of that topic." Consistent with his
view, Civil Code article 1834 provides that error as to the person invalidates
a contract "if the consideration of the person is the principal or only
cause." The article also describes "the contract of marriage" as an in-
stance where error has such "principal" significance. The Code gives no
further assistance in identifying the legally significant assumptions con-
cerning a prospective spouse. Toullier's commentary, however, suggests
that error involving certain very significant assumptions as to "qualities"
can be "determining motives" or "principal causes." 4 0 As an example,
he approvingly cites a French decision which declared null the marriage
of a devout Catholic and an ordained monk who had not revealed his
vocation." However, Toullier certainly believed that the assumptions pro-
viding basis for annulment should be extremely limited.
Civil Code article 183542 mirrors Toullier's view in providing that "the
consideration of the person is presumed by law to be the principal cause"
in "contracts of beneficence." Thus, in Toullier's example, the donee,
who was erroneously believed to be the donor's nephew, can be required
to relinquish the donation even though he shared the donor's belief that
they were related.' 3
Civil Code article 1836, a provision concerning onerous contracts and
meriting detailed examination, provides: "In onerous contracts, such as
sale, exchange, loan for interest, letting and hiring, the consideration of
the person is by law generally presumed to be an incidental cause, not
a motive for a contract." There is question, of course, as to the nature
of the circumstances which might justify the classification of a cause as
"principal" when it is "generally presumed" to be "incidental."
Nonetheless, this language suggests that there is room for some flexibility
in assessing the significance of assumptions as to a co-contractant in
onerous contracts. In the examples of contracts in which the considera-
tion of the person is not normally important, it is significant that the
examples are not limited to obligations requiring immediate performance.
For instance, the sale referred to is not described as a cash sale, and the
loan for interest necessarily involves a term during which payment is not
yet due. Under this view, parties who sell on credit or lend money would
not normally be permitted to rescind transactions because of mistaken
assumptions as to the identity or patrimony of their obligors. Consistent-
ly, if the item sold had not yet been delivered or the funds had not been
advanced, failure to render performance would constitute breach. In the
case of a cash sale or an exchange, the clear intention is to establish the
irrelevance of a co-contractant's identity. The reference to "letting" ' is
39. 3 C. Toullier, supra note 20, nos. 49-54, at 264-66.
40. Id. no. 50, at 264-65.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 38.
43. 3 C. ToUutIER, supra note 20, no. 51, at 265.
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in line with the previously discussed examples and is consistent also with
Toullier's view. 4 A lessor might have confused a lessee with a person
having greater ability to pay, but he, like the money lender, will have
a-remedy only if payment is not made when it is due. Similarly, the lessor
might be one notoriously difficult to endure. Nonetheless, at least "general-
ly," the lessee remains obliged in the absence of conduct justifying dissolu-
tion of the lease agreement.
The inclusion of "hiring" with the other contracts is of interest for
several reasons. First, the presence of this example may be attributable
to a translator's license. The French text of the Civil Code of 1825 re-
ferred only to louage in its enumeration.45 Louage, in French law, in-
cludes both the lease of "things" and the lease of "services or labor.""'
Thus, the translation of the term as "letting and hiring" may have ex-
pressed correctly the views of redactors who generally are believed to have
drafted in French and not to have participated in subsequent translation.
However, the particular services or labor of an individual and the other
performances mentioned in article 1836 are quite distinguishable. Certainly,
the skills of one party may be quite different from those of another he
was mistakenly thought to be. The drafters of the Code clearly believed
this distinction significant in certain instances. Thus, civil code article 1837
recognizes exceptions to article 1836:
If, from the nature of the onerous contract, it results that any
particular skill or quality be required in its execution, which the
party with whom the contract is made, is supposed to possess,
then the consideration of the person is presumed to be the prin-
cipal cause, and error as to the person invalidates the contract.
Thus, if intending to employ an architect of great eminence, the
party addresses himself by mistake to one of the same name, who
has little or no skill, the promise made to him for compensation
is void; but if anything be done by the person thus employed,
who was ignorant of the mistake, a compensation, proportioned
to his service, is due.
Thus, at least in the situation where a party believes he has secured
the services of an eminent architect, he is regarded as having sought "par-
ticular skill or quality," and his agreement with one of like name and
little skill provides basis for rescission. Because of the subjectivity in art
44. Id. no. 52, at 265.
45. The French text of article 1830 of the Civil Code of 1825 provided: "Dans les
contrats on~reux, tels que la vente, I'&change, le pr~t 6 inftr~t, le louage, la considdration
de la personne est gdndralement prdsumde par la toi etre une cause accessoire, mais non
Ia principale cause."
46. For example, French Civil Code article 1708 states: "f/y a deux sortes de contrats
de Iouage: Celui des choses, Et celui d'ouvrage." Louisiana Civil Code article 2673 similar-
ly provides: "There are two species of contracts of lease, to wit: 1. The letting out of
things. 2. The letting out of labor or industry."
[Vol. 44
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and design, the party who mistakenly deals with an architect might be
dissatisfied with the product no matter what the architect's skills and
reputation might be. Thus, the scope of article 1837's "exception" to the
"general" principal of article 1836 is difficult to determine. In this regard,
certain articles under the section heading, "Of Strictly Personal, Heritable
and Real Obligations," should be considered.4 7 First, an obligation is
strictly "personal" as to the "obligor" when it can be demanded only
of him and cannot be enforced against his heirs.48 Further, a party to
whom such an obligation is owed cannot be required to accept perfor-
mance from anyone other than the obligor who owes the performance.4 9
Thus, the following portion of Civil Code article 2007 is particularly signifi-
cant in interpreting articles 1836 and 1837:
All contracts for the hire of labor, skill or industry, without
any distinction, whether they can be as well performed by any
other as by the obligor, unless there be some special agreement
to the contrary, are considered as personal on the part of the
obligor, but heritable on the part of the obligee.
Accordingly, if a party contracts with a house painter with whom he in-
tends to contract, the party can refuse to accept performance from anyone
else the painter might seek to have perform in his stead, regardless of
the skills of the proffered substitute. In this case, the Code respects the
preference of the individual even though there are objective standards
through which the comparative abilities of substitute painters might be
measured. Because the identity of such an obligor is considered impor-
tant once a contract has been made, the execution of an agreement with
one mistaken for another logically should also be significant if error as
to the person is to be recognized as a basis of rescission of onerous con-
tracts. Because article 1837 makes clear that error does in certain instances
provide basis for such relief, the intention may have been to include all
instances where "labor, skill or industry" is involved in the sought after
performance. If this were so, then the inclusion of "hiring" in the trans-
lation of louage in article 1836 was ill-advised.
The solution to this question can have practical significance. If an
error as to the person is not encompassed by article 1837, the mistaken
party is obligated to either accept performance from the party with whom
he has dealt or compensate him so that he occupies the financial position
he would have occupied if both the parties had performed."0 On the other
47. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1997-2009.
48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1997. It provides in pertinent part: "An obligation is strictly
personal, when none but the obligee can enforce the performance or when it can be en-
forced only against the obligor."
49. Although this principle is not expressly stated, it is implicit in Civil Code articles
2000, 2007-2008.
50. Civil Code article 1934 expresses the Code's general provision concerning the con-
sequences of breach of a contractual obligation.
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hand, if relief is granted under article 1837, the contractor, under the
express terms of the article, is entitled only to "a compensation, propor-
tioned to his service" for any work he has done. However, because this
compensation is obviously not predicated upon any enrichment of the
mistaken party, the principle underlying the compensation must be the
reparation of injury to a good faith party. Accordingly, if the contractor
has foregone opportunities to enter like contractual arrangements because
of his commitment to the mistaken party, he should be compensated so
as to approximate the situation he would have occupied if he had never
dealt with the mistaken party. Thus, in a situation where the Code per-
mits 'rescission despite the good faith of the party not mistaken, it tempers
its impact by requiring the restoration of this party to his previous position.
Error as to the Nature of the Contract
Civil Code article 1841, the only article addressing the present topic,
provides:
Error as to the nature of the contract will render it void.
The nature of the contract is that which characterizes the obliga-
tion which it creates. Thus, if the party receives property, and
from error or ambiguity in the words accompanying the delivery,
believes that he has purchased, while he who delivers intends only
to pledge, there is not [no] contract.
Under its literal terms, no contractual relationship results from a trans-
action within its description, and there appears to be no requirement that
the perceptions of a party resisting the recognition of a contractual rela-
tionship be at least as well founded as those of a party seeking the recogni-
tion of the contractual relationship he perceived. Further, this article, unlike
article 1837," does not address the possible civil responsibility of a party
to whom the misunderstanding might be attributed. As to these matters,
the usually helpful reference to Toullier provides no assistance.
Error as to the Object of the Contract
The four articles concerning error as to the "object" of contracts
provide:
Art. 1842. Error as to thing
Error as to the thing, which is the subject of the contract, does
not invalidate it, unless it bears on the substance or some substan-
tial quality of the thing.' 2
51. See supra p. 892.
52. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1842.
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Art. 1843. Error as to substance
There is error as to the substance, when the object is of a totally
different nature from that which is intended. Thus, if the object
of the stipulation be supposed by one or both the parties to be
an ingot of silver, and it really is a mass of some other metal
that resembles silver, there is an error bearing on the substance
of the object."
Art. 1844. Error as to principal quality of object
The error bears on the substantial quality of the object, when
such quality is that which gives it its greatest value' A contract
relative to a vase, supposed to be gold, is void, if it be only plated
with that metal."
Art. 1845. Error as to other qualities of object
Error as to the other qualities of the object of the contract,
only invalidates it, when those qualities are such as were the prin-
cipal cause of making the contract."
Error as to the substance or error in substantia has long been a topic
of discussion in the civil law.' 6 Civil Code article 1843 is significant because
it literally provides that the error of one party alone is basis for rescis-
sion. There is no stated requirement that the complaining party be
reasonable in his conclusion as to substance, and article 1843 is not
expressly limited to situations where the party resisting rescission was or
should have been aware of the complaining party's error. If no such limita-
tions were intended, a party's reasonable expectations may be frustrated.
Nonetheless, in the example of the ingot sale, a good faith party would
at least be aware that the complaining party made an assumption as to
the ingot's composition and that this assumption. was crucial to his par-
ticipation in the sale. Also, unless there were other metals resembling silver
with similar market values, the party knowing the ingot to be of some
other metal would very likely be in bad faith, and thus, rescission would
be available on that basis.
The category of error as to "substantial quality" also presents cer-
tain difficulties. Foremost, it is necessary to determine whether rescission
is limited to situations where the party resisting rescission knew or should
have been aware of the other party's belief in the existence of the absent
quality. Unlike article 1843, Civil Code article 1844 does not expressly
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1843.
54. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1844.
55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1845.
56: See generally Litvinoff, Error in the Civil Law, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 222, 229 (J. Dainow ed. 1969).
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provide that the requisite error is present when it is made by only one
party, and its example refers only to a plated vase "supposed to be gold."
If the assumption of one party alone suffices to establish error as to the
substance in ingot sales, it is doubtful that something more would be re-
quired when the complaint is with a vase that is only gold plated. However,
the situations can be distinguished. In practically all ingot sales, each party
is aware that the other regards the item's composition as a matter of para-
mount significance. On the other hand, in the case of a vase or other
item crafted from raw material, one party might reasonably regard the
material used as a matter of little importance. Thus, if the workmanship
of the plated vase was such that other buyers would pay the agreed price
with full awareness of what they were purchasing, the seller need not
necessarily be aware that the buyer regards the item's composition to be
crucial. If error as to the substance and error as to a substantial quality
were so distinguished, a party's belief in the existence of a substantial
quality would provide basis for rescission only if the other party were
aware or should have been aware of this assumption. If, on the other
hand, such awareness or opportunity for awareness is not considered re-
quisite, the problem of identifying errors as to "substantial quality" re-
mains.
Where the agreed price is within the range of prices for which items
lacking the assumed attribute might be bought and sold by knowledgeable
parties, it is certainly difficult to identify an absent quality as one which
would give the item its greatest value. The presence of the nonexistent
quality would in many instances give the item a greater market value,
but without the quality, its market value would nonetheless approximate
the price actually paid. Thus, even if error as to the presence of a
"substantial quality" can be 'asserted when one party lacked basis to realize
that such an error was occurring, it seems necessary that the value of
the item with the quality be markedly greater than it would be without
the quality. Hence, the redactors probably intended article 1844 to govern
situations in which the party resisting rescission also believed the item
to have the nonexistent quality or the price involved made the assump-
tion of the existence of the quality quite reasonable. Furthermore, so to
limit the concept of substantial quality would be consistent with Civil Code
article 1845's concept of error as to the principal cause.
In providing that error as to qualities other than substance and
substantial quality do not provide basis for rescission unless these qualities
are the "principal cause" of the agreement, article 1845 incorporates con-
cepts of error as to motive." A buyer cannot, therefore, complain about
the absence of an attribute he thought an item to possess unless his vendor
should have perceived his belief. Further, the vendor should reasonably
understand that the buyer would not purchase but for his belief that the
57. See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
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item possesses the attribute, and circumstances must exist so that the ven-
dor cannot reasonably assert that the risk of the accuracy of the belief
is borne by the vendee alone.
Error Of Law
Civil Code article 1846 states, as a matter of general principle, that
"[e]rror in law, as well as error in fact, invalidates a contract, where
such error is its only or principal cause." Thus, erroneous assumptions
of law are included among those which may vitiate the consent requisite
to contractual commitment. The article then enumerates instances where
error of law provides no basis for relief. The first states that "if the con-
tract .. .fulfilled any such natural obligation as might from its nature
induce a presumption that it was made in consequence of the obligation,
and not from error of right, then such error shall not be alleged to avoid
the contract." An example is then provided: "Thus, the natural obliga-
tion to perform the will of the donor, prevents the donee from reclaim-
ing legacies or gifts he has paid under a testament void only for want
of form."
As in so many cases in the Code articles concerning error, Toullier's
influence is present. There was nothing novel in his approach concerning
the heir who pays a legacy without realizing that the will containing it
is invalid for lack of form. However, Toullier's rationalization of the out-
come is thought to be his own. He asserted that it was impossible to
determine whether the error of law underlay the delivery of the legacy58
because the heir could have been motivated by a desire to comply with
the expressed wishes of his ancestor. The fact that the heir asserts that
he would not have paid the legacy if he had known that he could not
be compelled to do so was believed to be inconclusive evidence of his
prior motivations. One admittedly cannot be certain as to what the heir
would have done had he had full knowledge of the situation. However,
the person willing to pursue legal remedies to regain the legacy may be
just the sort of person who would have knowingly disregarded his
ancestor's last wishes if he had been aware of the opportunity. Nonetheless,
Toullier, consistent with the view of Domat" and French Civil Code arti-
cle 1340, stated that the legacy could not be regained. Furthermore, he
articulated the principle underlying this solution more generally. An error
of law could not be regarded as the "principal cause" of a contract "if
the contract could have had for its motive the desire to satisfy an im-
perfect or a natural obligation." 60 This principle then was enacted in the
antecedent of present Civil Code article 1846.6
58. 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20, nos. 68-69, at 269. Domat, for instance, had expressed
a similar view. 1 J. DOmAT, T)rm CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER no. 1240, at 503 (Cushing
ed. 1850).
59. See supra note 58.
60. 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20, no. 68, at 269.
61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1840 (1825).
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The second part of article 1846 provides that a "contract, made for
the purpose of avoiding litigation, cannot be rescinded for error of law."
This provision is attributable to Toullier's discussion 62 of the French Civil
Code article so providing and restates the like provision presently con-
tained in Louisiana Civil Code article 3078.63 The essence of compromise
in Toullier's view is the existence of a dispute and the concomitant uncer-
tainty as to how the controversy might ultimately be resolved through
suit. Accordingly, in his example, if an uncle who believes his nephew
is entitled to share with him in the succession of the nephew's first cousin
executes an agreement with the nephew whereby the assets of the succes-
sion are partitioned equally, error of law is the only cause of the agree-
ment, and it can be rescinded. Here, in the absence of any dispute what-
soever, the agreement had no purpose other than the equal division of
goods between coheirs, and the uncle remains entitled to the entirety of
the succession. On the other hand, if the nephew asserted a claim to the
succession and the uncle resisted his demand, the uncle's subsequent agree-
ment to share the succession equally would bind him despite his ignorance
of the Code articles establishing his entitlement to the succession. 64 In
this case, in the face of conscious uncertainty as to the law, the parties'
choice to put an end to their dispute does just that.
The third part of article 1846 was repealed in 1982.65 The provision
was apparently drawn from Toullier's discussion of the partition involv-
ing the uncle and nephew who believed themselves to be coheirs and may
reasonably be regarded as an effort to espouse Toullier's views.6 6 The
significance of part three's last sentence concerning acquisitive prescrip-
tion will not be discussed.
The fourth part of article 1846 states that a "judicial confession of
a debt shall not be avoided by an allegation of error of law, though it
may be by showing an error of fact." This provision is a restatement
of the principle expressed in Civil Code article 2291 ,67 the counterpart
of French Civil Code article 1356. Toullier's explanation of the under-
62. 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20, no. 71, at 269-70.
63. Article 3078 provides: "Transactions have, between the interested parties, a force
equal to the authority of things adjudged. They can not be attacked on account of any
error in law or any lesion. But an error in calculation may always be corrected."
64. 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20, no. 73, at 270.
65. 1982 La. Acts, No. 187, § 2.
66. 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20, no. 63, at 267 & n.3; id. no. 73, at 270.
67. Article 2291 provides:
The judicial confession is the declaration which the party, or his special attorney
in fact, makes in a judicial proceeding.
It amounts to full proof against him who has made it.
It can not be divided against him.
It can not be revoked, unless it be proved to have been made through an error
in fact.
It can not be revoked on a pretense of an error in law.
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lying principle is identical to the one proffered in the case of the heir
who delivered the legacy expressed in the will lacking requisite formalities.
Thus, one who judicially confesses that he owes a legacy invalid for want
of form or an obligation which on its face has prescribed is precluded
from asserting his error.6" In each case, the existence of a natural obliga-
tion provides a possible explanation of the party's conduct and in any
event is regarded by the French and Louisiana Civil Codes as a sufficient
basis for upholding the confession." Error of fact, on the other hand,
is a basis for complaint. Thus, an heir who judicially confesses an obliga-
tion to deliver a legacy can avoid the confession upon discovery of a codicil
revoking the legacy in question."0
The fifth part of article 1846 specifies that a "promise or contract,
that destroys a prescriptive right, shall not be avoided by an allegation
that the party was ignorant or in an error with regard to the law of
prescription." In so providing, the Louisiana redactors followed Toullier's
suggestion that the principle concerning error of law in judicial confes-
sions be extended to extrajudicial commitments."
The last part of article 1846 concludes:
If a party has an exception, that destroys the natural as well
as the perfect obligation, and, through error of law makes a pro-
mise or contract that destroys such exception, he may avail himself
of such error; but if the exception destroys only the perfect, but
not the natural obligation, error of law shall not avail to restore
the exception.
The Code thereby states explicitly that a promise to render a performance
that could not be enforced without the promise will be judicially enforced,
despite any error of law, if the promise is one which fulfills a natural
obligation. Accordingly, the heir who promises to deliver the legacy ex-
pressed in a will lacking the requisite formalities can be required to do
so despite his contention that his promise was based solely upon belief
in the will's validity. By its express repudiation of such a defense in a
suit to enforce the promised performance, this subdivision undermines
any contention that the first subdivision's similar expression concerning
natural obligations is limited to situations where the natural obligation
actually has been fulfilled.
Other Civil Code Articles
In addition to the articles assembled beneath the error headings, the
Code contains a number of other articles that may require attention in
68. 3 C. TouIER, supra note 20, no. 74, at 271.
69. Id.; FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1356; LA. CIv. CODE art. 2291, quoted supra note 67.
70. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2291, quoted supra note 67; 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20,
no. 74, at 271.
71. 3 C. TOULLIER, supra note 20, no. 74, at 271.
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the resolution of controversies involving mistaken assumptions or
misunderstandings. The articles under the section heading, "Of the Cause
or Consideration of Contracts," 2 and those addressing impossibility of
performance," for instance, should certainly be considered in any endeavor
to formulate a general theory of error. Articles prescribing resolutions
for particular controversies, including most notably a number of the articles
concerning sales,7 ' are similarly relevant in searching for principles suscep-
tible of more general application. Finally, several of the code articles con-
cerning "Interpretation of Agreements".'5 are significant in considering
the extent to which contractual commitment, despite misunderstanding,
can be recognized and defined in accordance with the perceptions of one
of the parties. These articles and their possible implications will be ex-
amined in conjunction with the forthcoming discussion of the
jurisprudence.
MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS
The Jurisprudential Concept of Error as to Principal Cause
In an overwhelming number of Louisiana appellate cases involving
the legal significance of a contracting party's error, the courts identify
the "principal cause" of the "agreement" and grant relief if the error
is found to have affected this principal cause. 6 This approach is not limited
to situations where the error can be fitted into one of the Code categories
of error as to "motive," "person," or "object of the contract." The
courts have sought to identify principal cause even in situations where
an obligation has been ambiguously defined and the parties have asserted
different understandings as to the intended commitment." When the courts
seek to identify principal cause, they consider the perceptions of the party
resisting rescission, as well as those of the party asserting that his error
is legally significant. In nearly all situations, the courts, in line with the
provision in Civil Code article 182678 concerning error in the motive, have
held that an erroneous assumption cannot be identified as a principal cause
unless the party resisting rescission knew or had reasonable basis for
recognizing the existence of the assumption and its significance to the com-
plaining party.' 9 In addition to the case of error as to the "motive," the
Code drafters clearly intended this restriction on the availability of relief
to apply to most errors concerning the "qualities" of the "object of the
72. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1893-1900.
73. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1891, 2031-2033.
74. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2443, 2452, 2455, 2520-2544.
75. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1945, 1957-1958. See generally LA. CIv. CODE arts.
1945-1962.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 83-151.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 152-63.
78. Quoted supra p. 888.
79. One of the few cases departing from this practice is Pollard v. Ingram, 308 So.
2d 860 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
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contract." 8 On the other hand, in the case of error as to the "nature"
of an agreement, and error as to the "substance" or the "substantial
quality" of a contractual object, the Code framers may have intended
the existence of a party's error to be basis for relief even if the other
party had no basis for perceiving that error was occurring." This was
unquestionably the framers' intention in the case of certain errors "as
to person." 82 Accordingly, in the upcoming examination of cases resolved
by the courts in terms of principal cause, effort will be made to identify
situations involving errors within classifications expressly recognized by
Code articles.
Beyond the prevalent assertion that a "motive" or "cause" cannot
constitute a "principal cause" unless the party resisting rescission knew
or had basis for knowing of its existence, the opinions of the appellate
courts offer little doctrinal guidance concerning the factors to be weighed
in allocating the risks of inaccurate assumptions by contracting parties.
The opinion in the 1973 case of Cryer v. M & M Manufacturing Co.,83
provides what is probably the most significant effort to express principles
having general application.
Some motives are readily discernible from the inherent nature
of a sale. For example, an immediate end of the buyer is to
acquire ownership of the thing sold. That motive characterizes
the transaction. Other motives, not discernible from the inherent
nature of the sale, rise to the status of principal cause only when
the parties contract on that basis. Although the parties need not
make the motive an express condition of the contract, it must
appear from all the circumstances that the existence of the sale
has been subordinated to the reality of the motive. The special
motive must have been a constitutive element of the accord of
wills. The reality of the motive becomes a tacit condition of the
contract.'
However, the opinion does not attempt to identify factors which, as a
general proposition, will support a conclusion that a "motive" was a "con-
stitutive element" or "tacit condition" of the contract. Nonetheless, the
court does identify the factors influencing its decision in the controversy
before it, and this identification, together with the previously quoted discus-
sion, provides basis from which some generalizations might be drawn.
Accordingly, the controversy involved will be examined carefully in subse-
quent discussion.'
80. See supra text accompanying note 57.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
83. 273 So. 2d 818 (La. 1973).
84. Id. at 822.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 108-19.
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In some of the cases employing principal cause language in allocating
the risk of inaccuracy of assumptions, the party seeking relief had ar-
ticulated the assumption in question. In some situations, misrepresenta-
tions by the party seeking to uphold the transaction influenced the com-
plaining party in reaching the assumption which proved inaccurate. In
other cases, the courts' classifications of assumptions as principal causes
were possibly affected by unarticulated judicial suspicions that unproved
misrepresentations influenced the complaining party. However, the im-
mediate discussion is limited to cases where no misrepresentations were
established. The cases selected for discussion involve sales and assignments,
the categories of contract most frequently involved in principal cause
determinations.
Decisions Not Involving Misrepresentations
In the 1964 decision of Stack v. Irwin,'6 the Louisiana Supreme Court
identified an error "relating to the known, principal cause of the
contract."' 7 The controversy concerned an agreement for the sale of im-
movable property. The buyer brought suit for rescission grounded upon
the existence of latent defects in the property. The seller resisted the claim
and reconvened for specific performance. Both the trial court and the
court of appeal decreed specific performance but reduced the purchase
price to compensate for latent defects. In reversing and recognizing the
buyer's claim for rescission, the supreme court, in accordance with long
standing jurisprudence, ruled that the agreement was not a sale but a
contract to sell because the parties contemplated the subsequent execu-
tion of a formal act. Accordingly, the court found the sales articles
regulating redhibitory defects to be inapplicable and sought to determine
whether the buyer's error concerning the existence of the latent defects
affected the principal cause of the contract. After quoting Civil Code article
1825, the court stated:
This codal provision, in our opinion, contemplates a defect in
the thing to be sold that renders it so imperfect that the contract
would not have been made had the true facts been known. If
such a defect existed, the fact that it can be remedied does not
defeat the rescission of the contract, for the rescission is founded
upon a vice of consent.
As reflected by the record, the determining motive, or prin-
cipal cause, of the plaintiff was to secure a residence so free of
substantial defects that no major repairs would be required. From
the negotiations, the motive that dominated the plaintiff was either
known to the other parties to the contract or must be presumed
to have been known."
86. 246 La. 777, 167 So. 2d 363 (1964).
87. 246 La. at 784, 167 So. 2d at 365.
88. 246 La. at 784-85, 167 So. 2d at 366 (footnotes omitted).
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Thereafter, the court, considering the magnitude of the defects, concluded
that rescission was warranted.
The Stack decision is interesting both in its conclusion concerning the
applicability of the redhibition articles to contracts to sell and its discus-
sion of factors bearing upon the identification of principal cause. As to
the role of the redhibition articles, the traditional jurisprudential distinc-
tion between sales and contracts to sell provides a ready basis for deny-
ing the mandatory application of these articles. 9 Nonetheless, the buyer
under a contract to sell should certainly be entitled to any remedy that
would be recognized under the redhibition articles if the sale were com-
pleted. On the other hand, under the redhibition articles, a price reduc-
tion, or, today, 90 an opportunity to remedy deficiencies may be recog-
nized as a permissible alternative to rescission. By finding that the avail-
ability of rescission was not dependent upon the rules of redhibition, the
court avoided the constraints which might be imposed by prior decisions
concerning the choice between rescission and price adjustment. This posi-
tion is quite reasonable. The redhibition decisions normally concern situa-
tions where property has been delivered and the purchase price has been
paid. Months may have passed between delivery and the discovery of the
defects. Such factors may well have influenced past decisions to award
a price adjustment as opposed to rescission. Thus, in a situation where
the defects are discovered before the transaction progresses to its normal
conclusion, it is reasonable to recognize rescission based upon the existence
of serious defects, even if these defects might only be treated as a basis
for price adjustment under the jurisprudence concerning redhibition in
completed sales.
Turning to the decision's implications for a general theo'y of prin-
cipal cause, the assumption recognized as a principal cause concerned the
physical attributes of an object to be sold. The buyer was found to have
assumed the object to be sound and without latent defects of magnitude
necessitating what the court termed "major repairs," and the court easily
concluded that the seller was aware or should have been aware that the
buyer desired to acquire a house without such serious shortcomings. Buyers
unquestionably prefer that structures be free of significant latent defects,
and sellers certainly are aware of this preference. The significant question
is why the parties are regarded as having dealt in certainties so that the
validity of the transaction depends upon the absence of defective condi-
tions. The reason the buyer does not bear the risk of the existence of
defective conditions in the contract to sell is expressly found in the Civil
Code articles governing sales. Although the court in Stack found these
redhibition articles inapplicable to the contract to sell, these articles
89. See 2 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 122 in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 225-31
(1975).
90. Since its amendment in 1974, Civil Code article 2531 has provided a seller "who
knew not the vices of a thing" an opportunity to "repair, remedy or correct" them.
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prescribe the risk allocation recognized in Stack through the language of
principal cause. If the buyer in the completed sale is entitled to rescission
or a monetary adjustment in the case of significant latent defects, the
buyer under the contract to sell is entitled to at least that same protec-
tion. Thus,, the redhibition articles make clear that the buyer is not to
be regarded as having taken his chances concerning the existence of signifi-
cant latent defects, and if the concept of principal cause is utilized in
determining the significance of latent defects in a contract to sell, the
acquisition of an item without significant latent defects is properly iden-
tified as the buyer's principal cause. Because the Code dictates the risk
allocation recognized by the court in Stack and the court does not at-
tempt to explain its principal cause identification except in stating that
sellers know or should know of buyers' desires to avoid structures with
significant latent defects, the implications of the decision for the iden-
tification of principal cause in other transactions are basically the inferences
that can be drawn from the concept of redhibition.
Marchand v. United Companies Mortgages & Investments9 is another
of the many cases holding that an erroneous assumption cannot be iden-
tified as a principal cause warranting rescission unless the party resisting
rescission had reasonable basis for realizing that the assumption was being
made. The buyer sought to rescind a completed sale of a residence based
upon his erroneous belief that the lot included an acre of land. The buyer's
belief as to the size of the lot was based upon dimensions supplied by
a realtor who had previously appraised the property for the vendor. When
the buyer consulted this realtor concerning the availability of housing,
the realtor telephoned the vendor, and upon learning that the property
in question might be purchased, he showed the buyer a copy of the ap-
praisal, including a sketch depicting the property to have dimensions en-
compassing an area of one acre. The property itself had no fences or
other visible boundaries. After the buyer and the realtor viewed the prop-
erty, the buyer and a representative of the seller reached agreement for
its sale, and a formal act of sale was ultimately executed. The act of
sale correctly described the seller's interest and thus did not utilize dimen-
sions defining an area of one acre. The trial court found that the buyer
believed the lot to include an acre of land and that the realtor's erroneous
belief as to the lot's size was based upon his own failure to make ade-
quate investigation concerning its dimensions. Accepting these findings,
the court of appeal ruled that the articles under the Code paragraph
heading, "Of Error in the Motive," were applicable and concluded, in
light of Civil Code article 1826, that rescission was available only if the
seller knew or could be presumed to have known of the buyer's error.
The court reasoned:
91. 335 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976)
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There is no question that vendee proceeded in this matter under
an error of fact-he thought he was purchasing an acre of land
when in fact he got much less. Further, it is clear from the
testimony that the principal cause, or motive, for vendee's pur-
chase was to acquire an acre of land, rather than simply a lot
of any or average size. Regardless, though, of the importance of
this criterion to the vendee, there is no evidence that the vendor
was apprised of this motive. Nor can it be presumed that from
the nature of the transaction the vendor knew it. The apparent
motive in buying a house and lot is to acquire a suitable and
adequate place in which to live. The testimony and evidence
establishes that the property conveyed fit that purpose. Further,
the price paid was fair considering the value of the property. 2
The court did not discuss the possibility of imputing the realtor's
misrepresentations as to the lot's dimensions to the vendor. Even without
this imputation, representatives of the corporate vendor had viewed the
appraisal, and one might contend that the vendor as well as the vendee
believed the property to have dimensions encompassing one acre. However,
the written instrument of sale described only property actually owned by
the seller. Thus, if the vendor is not to be held responsible for the realtor's
misrepresentations or charged with awareness of their occurrence, the court
was probably correct in finding that the vendor believed the buyer to in-
tend to buy only what the vendor had to sell.
The court applied articles addressing error in the motive to the buyer's
error concerning the dimensions of the property. These articles, standing
alone, can certainly be read broadly to encompass this situation. However,
other articles must also be considered in determining what the Code
framers had in mind. Civil Code articles 1842-1845 address error as to
the "object" of a contract and provide that such error invalidates a con-
tract only when it bears on the object's substance, substantial quality,
or other qualities which were the principal cause of making the contract.3
Because these articles clearly apply to physical characteristics of corporeal
objects, they too must be considered in assessing the buyer's complaint.
Civil Code article 1845 does not define principal cause but indicates that
its identification depends on the particularities of the transaction. Thus,
it is reasonable to employ the criteria of article 1826 in defining the term
in the case of error as to the "object." Therefore, if the buyer's error
as to the dimensions of the property is significant only if it can be classified
as an error as to the principal cause under article 1845, the error of the
buyer in Marchand provided no basis for relief because the seller neither
knew nor was presumed to know of the buyer's error. Thus, the court's
92. Id. at 797-98.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
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application of article 1826, as opposed to article 1845, did not affect the
resolution of the controversy.
Theriot v. Chaudoir,9 " an 1841 decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court, involves an interesting principal cause identification. The plain-
tiff, who had possession of two sections of land owned by the United
States, transferred his "pretensions" to these tracts to the defendants
through a written instrument, apparently entitled an act of sale. When
the defendants subsequently refused to pay a note representing a portion
of the purchase price, the plaintiff brought suit. Resisting the demand,
the defendants alleged that an error in the motive entitled them to rescis-
sion of the transaction and return of the portion of the price they had
paid. The defendants acknowledged awareness that the United States owned
the property in question but contended "that they were led by plaintiff
to believe that he had that sort of possession which from time to time
Congress has approved of as entitling the possessor to a preference in
a purchase from the United States.""5 Congress, unbeknown to both
parties, had previously designated the land in question as a "live oak
reservation" and thereby minimized the likelihood of its availability in
any future public offerings. The defendants contended that their error
as to this occurrence provided basis for rescission. The plaintiff, on the
other hand, contended that he transferred only his "possession and en-
joyment and the hope that the United States would permit it to be
continued. '9 6 From the testimony concerning the parties' negotiations, the
buyers' subsequent efforts to acquire the property from the government,
and the magnitude of the price paid, the court concluded that both the
plaintiff and the defendants had regarded the plaintiff's pretentions as
entitling him to preference over other persons in any future offerings.
Thus, the court held that rescission was appropriate because the tracts
in question had already been reserved for governmental purposes.
The decision is reasonably based. Evidence proved that the buyers'
participation in the transaction, to the seller's knowledge, was prompted
by a desire to obtain a claim that would be recognized if the government
decided to sell the tracts in question. Thus, it was necessary to determine
whether the buyers should bear the risk of a preexisting decision to devote
the land to governmental purposes. Two factors strongly suggested that
the buyers should not be so burdened. First, the parties' attention was
focused on the likelihood of future government decisions, and it was
extremely unlikely that either side ever considered the possibility that the
government's decision had already been made. This factor, of course, was
not a conclusive basis for risk allocation. Nonetheless, it clearly evidenced
that the parties were not engaging in conscious chance taking as to
94. 17 La. 445 (1841).
95. Id. at 446-47.
96. Id. at 447.
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this risk. Second, the large price resulted in a significant disparity be-
tween the values of the performances or prestations. Disparity between
these values (lesion) is in itself basis for relief in only very limited situa-
tions. Nonetheless, when the disparity is attributable to an error that
substantially shaped the terms of the agreement, it is rational to regard
the error as significant in the absence of strong reasons suggesting that
it be disregarded. On this point, the court commented that "in a case
of doubt [it] would incline in favor of a party striving to avoid a loss
against one seeking to obtain a gain."' 97
Walker v. Don Coleman Construction Co.," identified error in the
principal cause as an alternative basis for rescinding an agreement to sell
a 250 acre tract of immovable property. The buyer's commitment under
the agreement was expressly conditioned upon the approval of the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) of the property for
subdivision development. For the first time in the Shreveport-Bossier area,
HUD required an environmental impact statement to be submitted with
the application for approval. Six months after imposing this requirement,
HUD advised that its decision could not be reached until an impact study
for a proposed parkway was completed. Some time thereafter the seller
under the agreement to sell sued for rescission. At the time of trial, the
parkway study, estimated to require a minimum of fourteen months for
completion, had not begun. Thus, the earliest point at which HUD's deci-
sion might be announced would be approximately thirty-one months after
the agreement had been entered. The trial court concluded that such an
extended delay had not been contemplated by the parties and ruled that
the agreement would be rescinded unless the buyer waived the condition
and accepted performance.
On appeal, the buyer contended that Civil Code article 20389" requires
parties who have not set a time limit for the happening of a condition
to await its occurrence as long as it might possibly occur. The court of
appeal reasoned that article 2038 is limited by Civil Code article 2037's
requirement that a condition "be performed in the manner that it is prob-
able that the parties wished and intended that it should be." Applying
this principle to the situation before it, the court readily concluded that
the parties could not possibly have anticipated the delay resulting from
an environmental impact study dependent upon the completion of the
parkway impact study. 00
97. Id. at 448.
98. 338 So. 2d 1183 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
99. Article 2038 provides:
When an obligation has been contracted on condition that an event shall happen
within a limited time, the condition is considered as broken, when the time has
expired without the event having taken place. If there be no time fixed, the con-
dition may always be performed, and it is not considered as broken, until it is
become certain that the event will not happen.
100. 338 So. 2d at 1185.
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As an additional ground for rescission, the court identified "perfor-
mance of the contract within a reasonable time""' as a principal cause
of the contract. This cause was found to be apparent from the inherent
nature of an agreement to sell immovable property and from the cir-
cumstances evidencing the desire of the litigants to close the matter as
rapidly as possible. The court stated that "the parties' failure to anticipate
the unreasonable delay was error of fact sufficient to vitiate their consent
and invalidate the contract."'0 2
The court's resolution of the controversy was well based. Once it con-
cluded that article 2038 did not prescribe the outcome of the controversy,
the same factors that provided the basis for concluding that the contract
was subject to an implied term justified the court's conclusion that the
consent was vitiated by error.
In Jefferson Truck Equipment Co. v. Guarisco Motor Co.,'0 3 the
plaintiff sued for the agreed price of a lifting device which it had in-
stalled on a truck supplied by the defendant. The defendant, who had
the lifting device removed from the truck shortly after its installation,
denied responsibility because the device's rated and guaranteed lifting
capacity did not meet the specifications of the party for whom the device
was being obtained. The plaintiff, however, asserted that it was fully aware
of the manufacturer's rating and guarantee and that any "unilateral" error
of the defendant as to these matters provided no basis for rescinding the
transaction. The plaintiff acknowledged that it was aware that the defen-
dant had been contemplating the acquisition of a lifting device of another
manufacturer which had a rated lifting capacity in excess of the rated
capacity of the device installed. However, the plaintiff contended that it
had supplied literature revealing the latter device's rated capacity prior
to the time that the defendant placed the order for its installation. The
defendant, who had no background concerning lifting devices, asserted
that he had been assured that the device he ordered was equivalent to
the one he previously had been considering. The trial court found that
the defendant had bargained for a device with a manufacturer's rating
and guarantee that would meet its client's requirements but the plaintiff
had contemplated the sale of a device having a mechanical performance
capability meeting the needs of the defendant's client. Thus, it held the
sale "invalid" because of the absence of a "meeting of the minds."
The court of appeal found that the plaintiff was "fully aware that
defendant intended to purchase a device with a specified rated and
guaranteed lifting . . . capacity"' ' and that it "took it upon itself to
101. Id. at 1186.
102. Id.
103. 250 So. 2d 211 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
104. Id. at 215.
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furnish defendant a crane that could possibly or probably do the work,
but was not rated or guaranteed to do so."" The legal issue, in the court's
opinion, was the existence of "error as to the qualities of the crane relating
to the principal cause of the contract."' 6 The court concluded that defen-
dant's mistaken assumption as to the rated capacity was such an error.
The basis for this classification was found in Civil Code articles 1826
and 1845. The court noted that an error not concerning substance or
substantial quality may provide a basis for rescission under the latter ar-
ticle if the absent quality constitutes the principal cause for making the
agreement. The court reasoned that principal cause under this article should
be defined in light of article 1826, and that an error should not be so
classified unless the party seeking to uphold the agreement was "apprised
of" or "presumed" to have known of the resisting party's inaccurate
assumption. Because the plaintiff was found to have had knowledge of
the defendant's assumption, the agreement was held "subject to rescis-
sion for lack of requisite consent."'' 7
The controversy in Cryer v. M & M Manufacturing Co. , 0 presented
interesting questions concerning the significance of error in agreements
transferring incorporeal rights. Cryer, the holder of manufacturing rights
to a newly designed kerosene heater, retained the services of a mechanical
engineer to improve and test the heater for orchard heating services. After
making improvements and conducting tests, the engineer submitted a writ-
ten report specifying the heater's BTU output and identifying its suitable
uses, including orchard heating. The report further provided that the tests
extended over two 24-hour periods. Once the report was submitted, Cryer
advised M & M Manufacturing Co. (M & M) of his willingness to discuss
transfer of his rights and subsequently provided the company with a copy
of the report and a sample heater. Approximately six weeks after the report
and heater were delivered and M & M had demonstrated the heater to
fruit and vegetable growers, Cryer and M & M entered into a written
agreement for the transfer of manufacturing rights. The agreement de-
scribed M & M's obligation in three separate paragraphs. The first describ-
ed the payment of $12,500 in cash. The second identified a commitment
to pay a "royalty" of $1.25 for each unit manufactured. The third set
forth a commitment to "use due diligence and good business practices
in expanding the manufacture and distribution"' 09 of the heater and pro-
vided that M & M was obligated to manufacture a minimum of 5000
units during the first year of production. Under further terms of the agree-
ment, Cryer transferred the manufacturing and distribution rights with
105. Id.
106. Id. at 212.
107. Id. at 216.
108. 273 So. 2d 818 (La. 1973).
109. Id. at 828 n.l.
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"legal warranties." ' " The agreement contained no express warranty as
to the capacity of the heater or its suitability for particular heating pur-
poses. During subsequent testing, M & M discovered that soot accumula-
tion impaired the efficiency of the heater so that it could only produce
heat sufficient to protect vegetation for periods of three to five hours.
When extensive efforts to remedy the deficiency failed, M & M conclud-
ed that the heater was unmarketable and abandoned the project. At the
end of the contract year, Cryer sued for $6250, the royalty for 5000 units.
M & M, seeking rescission on grounds of error, failure of cause, and
redhibition, reconvened. The trial court applied the Code articles concern-
ing redhibition to the controversy, and because it found the heater im-
perfect and unsuitable for orchard heating, decreed a $6250 price reduc-
tion which extinguished the royalty claim. The court of appeal reversed
and granted Cryer judgment for $6250.
In reviewing this judgment, the supreme court first addressed the ap-
plicability of the redhibition articles. Because the object of the sale, the
right to manufacture and distribute, was incorporeal, the court concluded
that the redhibition articles were inapplicable. The Court next addressed
the contention that error and failure of cause provided basis for rescis-
sion. After characterizing the failure of cause argument as an alternative
formulation of the complaint expressed in terms of error, the court con-
trasted error as to "the determining motive, or principal cause" with error
as to a "subsidiary motive," a category of error said to have no effect
upon a contract's validity. The court stated that a motive "discernible
from the inherent nature" of a transaction was a principal cause and cited
as an example the buyer's aim of acquiring ownership in the contract
of sale. Motives not discernible from the inherent nature of the transac-
tion, however, were said to "rise to the status of principal cause only
when the parties contract on that basis."'"
The court then turned to the controversy before it and noted that
the buyer did become owner of the right to manufacture and distribute.
Thus, "the immediate end that characterizes a sale generally was
achieved.""' Next, the court considered M & M's contention that an ad-
ditional motive should be identified as a principal cause of the transac-
tion. This motive, as understood by the court, was one to secure the
manufacturing rights to a long-burning, high-output heater to sell to or-
chardists for freeze protection. M & M further contended that Cryer had
represented the heater to have the qualities that M & M sought and that
this representation provided an additional basis for identifying the assump-
tion of the existence of these qualities as a principal cause. The court,
however, in accordance with the findings of the lower courts, concluded
110. Id. at 820 n.3.
111. Id. at 822.
112. Id. at 823.
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that Cryer had made no misrepresentations concerning the attributes of
the heater. Thus the court refused to regard Cryer's supplying of a copy
of the mechanical engineer's report as a representation that the engineer's
conclusions concerning the heater were correct. After emphasizing that
M & M had been given ample opportunity to test the device and finding
that the seller intended that the manufacturer rely on its own skill and
judgment as to the heater's performance, the court concluded:
The manufacturer was aware that the heater was newly
developed. The purchase of manufacturing rights to it was
speculative in some degree. One who expresses an unqualified will
to purchase such rights should be bound accordingly unless the
seller knows or should know that the purchaser's will is condi-
tional. No basis for this knowledge appears in the record. Rather,
it appears that, following the manufacturer's investigation and ex-
ercise of judgment, the seller reasonably contemplated an uncon-
ditional transaction. We find nothing in the contract or the cir-
cumstances under which it was formed to raise the manufacturer's
expectations for the heater to the contractual level of principal
cause. 3
M & M's primary complaint concerned the inability of the heaters to
sustain significant heat production over an extended period. Because the
engineer's report described operation at a constant BTU level over twenty-
four consecutive hours, M & M contended that both parties assumed this
performance capability to exist. Thus, in M & M's view, the existence
of this attribute was regarded as a matter of certainty, and the parties'
error on this point should have provided basis for rescission. Cryer, on
the other hand, asserted that he intended a transaction in which M &
M would make its own assessment of performance capabilities and bear
the risk of any inaccuracy in this assessment. If the engineer's report had
not been supplied, the transaction would certainly be regulated in accor-
dance with Cryer's view. The heater design was new, and no heaters had
ever been in commercial use. Thus, in the absence of the engineer's report,
M & M would have had no basis except its own testing for assessing per-
formance capabilities and should certainly have been required to bear the
risk of any inaccurate assessment it might make. The engineer's report,
however, provided a basis for belief that sample heaters had successfully
operated over twenty-four hour periods, and M & M's belief as to this
extended operation capability could well have been classified as a prin-
cipal cause. This is particularly so if Cryer were viewed as having
represented that the engineer's report accurately described the results of
tests actually conducted.
In examining the implications of the decision for a general theory
113. Id. at 824.
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of principal cause, it is important to remember that the court described
the transaction as somewhat speculative and concluded that the seller had
reasonable basis for perceiving that the buyer was to determine the sound-
ness of the design for itself. The decision thus illustrates that a party,
although known by the other to participate in a transaction because of
certain assumptions as to attributes of the contractual object, may bear
the risk that his assumptions are inaccurate. In particular, the decision
suggests that such a risk allocation may be appropriate where the party
who asserts that he viewed his assumption as a matter of certainty might
more rationally have assessed it in terms of probabilities.
The decision is of interest on another point. The majority, like the
court of appeal, not only denied rescission of the sale but refused to relieve
M & M of its expressed commitment to manufacture 5000 heaters. The
dissent, however, while concurring in the decision to deny rescission of
the sale, expressed opinion that M & M should be relieved of its remain-
ing commitment.'' 4 Justice Tate expressed his position in terms of prin-
cipal cause and reasoned that the "speculative" nature of the sale agree-
ment and an awareness that "refined development" depended to some
extent upon the manufacturer's skill prevented recognition of error as to
the principal cause in the transfer of the manufacturing rights. In his
words, the manufacturer "took his chances that he would not be able
to perfect a workable product."'' 5 Nonetheless, he identified an error as
to the principal cause of the obligation to pay royalty-an assumption
that "the manufacturer could perfect a merchantable unit, using due
diligence."'", He reasoned that the parties could not have contemplated
a responsibility "to produce 5000 unworkable units or to pay royalty for
the manufacture of an unusable product."' ' 1
7
On rehearing, Justice Tate, joined by Justice Barham, advanced ad-
ditional reasons for his position. His opinion was based principally upon
the contention that the obligation to pay royalties was subject to an im-
plied condition that M & M be able to manufacture a merchantable
heater." 8 Justice Tate was correct in observing that a party incurring multi-
ple obligations in a single agreement might be relieved of one or more
of these commitments without necessarily being relieved of all of them.
The availability of such an approach in the instant case depends upon
the characterization of the "royalty." If it is regarded as the deferred
portion of an agreed purchase price, then the refusal to rescind the assign-
ment requires the recognition of a responsibility to pay this sum. If, on
the other hand, this responsibility is truly keyed to the manufacture of
114. Id. at 826-28 (Tate, J., dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 826.
116. Id. at 826-27.
117. Id. at 827.
118. Id. at 828-30.
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items, then an assumption that these items will possess sufficient utility
to have a realistic chance of sale could be recognized as a principal cause
even though the shortcomings of the design itself are not accepted as basis
for rescinding the transfer of manufacturing rights. The majority's rejec-
tion of this approach apparently stemmed from its unwillingness to regard
the merits of the design as uncertain in the transfer but reasonably
established in the case of the commitment to manufacture. This position,
as acknowledged by Justice Tate," 9 is quite persuasive. Nonetheless, if
the obligation to pay a "royalty" on mandatory production is not regarded
as an obligation to pay a deferred portion of the purchase price, the risk
of inaccuracy of the buyer's assessments as to the merits of the design
could be differently allocated in the case of each obligation.
Ratcliff v. Mcllhenny"2 I also concerned risk allocation in the assign-
ment of incorporeal rights. The plaintiff, who had acquired an option
to purchase immovable property, assigned his rights under this agreement
to the defendant. When the defendant refused to pay the credit portion
of the agreed price, the plaintiff brought suit. The defendant asserted that
the title of the party extending the option was unmerchantable and con-
tended that his commitment to pay was therefore without consideration.
In concluding that the defendant was indebted despite any unmerchant-
ability, the court commented:
The assignment of an option to buy is therefore nothing more
than the sale of an incorporeal right; and hence, all that the seller
warrants is the existence of that right,. not the solvency of the
obligor (i.e. the ability of the obligor to perform his contract).
R. C. C. arts. 2646, 2647.11
If the Code allocates the risk of unmerchantability of title to the assignee
in the assignment of an option, rescission grounded upon error is certain-
ly precluded. Civil Code article 2647, however, does not expressly prescribe
this allocation. This article, included in the chapter entitled, "Of the
Assignment or Transfer of Credits and Other Incorporeal Rights," pro-
vides that "[tihe seller does not warrant the solvency of the debtor, unless
he has agreed so to do." Accordingly, the assignee of a claim has no
legal complaint against the assignor simply because the debtor's insolven-
cy impairs the money value of a judgment against him. A statement
negating such complaint need not be construed, as it was by the court,
to encompass "the ability of the obligor to perform" and thus to foreclose
the possibility of rescission grounded upon the assignee's error concern-
ing the title of the party extending the option.
This is not to say that the court made an inappropriate risk alloca-
119. Id. at 827.
120. 157 La. 708, 102 So. 878 (1925).
121. 157 La. at 712, 102 So. at 879.
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tion in the transaction. Louisiana courts have found a wide range of com-
plaints to render title unmerchantable. Thus, parties familiar with trans-
actions in immovables may well be cognizant of the risk that a title might
be so regarded. Similarly, parties with such familiarity are probably also
aware of the significant probability that a title examination was not con-
ducted prior to the execution of the option agreement. Hence, the court
may have correctly expressed the understanding of some assignees of op-
tions when it stated that the assignor in such a transaction purports only
to have the contractual right to demand a conveyance by the party grant-
ing the option. Nonetheless, situations could arise in which the magnitude
of the price of the assignment would negate any inference that the assignee
was engaging in conscious risk taking as to title. Because these situations
may occur and involve parties with little or no experience in such trans-
actions, courts should reject the questionable construction of Civil Code
article 2647 and thus hold open the possibility of relief grounded upon
error in situations where the assignee could not reasonably have been
perceived to contemplate a risk-taking transaction.
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure
Louisiana Civil Code article 2529 provides: "A declaration made in
good faith by the seller, that the thing has some quality which it is found
not to have, gives rise to a redhibition, if this quality was the principal
motive for making the purchase." This article has received surprisingly
little attention in Louisiana jurisprudence. In the case of error analysis
in general, Civil Code article 1845 provides for rescission in the case of
error as to "the qualities of an object" when these qualities "were the
principal cause of making the contract."' 22 As previously discussed,' 23 prin-
cipal cause, as used in this article, has been defined in accordance with
Civil Code article 1826."24 Thus, an assumption as to the existence of
a quality of a corltractual object is not defined as a principal cause unless
the party resisting rescission knew or should have known that the assump-
tion was crucial to the complaining party's participation in the transac-
tion. Accordingly, when a party not only knows that an assumption is
important to his co-contractant, but also has affirmed that the assump-
tion is accurate, the assumption can be identified as one affecting prin-
cipal cause without resort to Civil Code article 2529. However, because
article 2529 was intended to identify certain representations as a basis for
rescission when relief could not be had under the other articles concern-
ing redhibition, it suggests that close questions might be resolved in favor
.of rescission when the party seeking to uphold the transaction has himself
affirmed-that a shared assumption is accurate. In any event, article 2529
has played a negligible role in the development of a general theory of
122. See supra text accompanying note 52.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
124. See supra p. 888.
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error and has received only slightly greater attention in the development
of the law concerning the responsibility of a seller who has sold goods
lacking qualities he has described." '2
On the other hand, the cases concerning allegations of purposeful
misrepresentations and impermissible nondisclosures have received an in-
teresting treatment in terms of a concept of error as to principal cause.
Stated simply, the Louisiana courts are extremely reluctant to classify asser-
tions or suppressions as fraudulent. 2 ' Nonetheless, in situations in which
parties seeking to uphold transactions knew that significant assumptions
of their co-contractants were erroneous, the courts are quite inclined to
classify these assumptions as principal causes.
The case of Marcello v. Bussiere"7 is illustrative. The plaintiff, the
lessee of a building in which a lounge had been operated, agreed to
sublease the building to the defendants. He also sold them bar equipment
located within the premises. The bar was not in operation at the time
of the transaction, and, after the defendants had begun renovation of
the structure, they discovered that they could not obtain an alcoholic
beverage license, and therefore, they discontinued payment of rent. The
plaintiff sued for the rent for the remainder of the lease term, and the
defendants, alleging fraud and error, reconvened for rescission of the lease
and sale. The lounge had been closed for the six months immediately
preceding the transaction because the local authorities had revoked the
necessary alcoholic beverage license, and the defendants, in the words of
the trial judge, were unable to obtain a license because of the "attitude"
of the local officials concerning the "reputation" of the business. The
defendants asserted that the plaintiff had advised that the lounge was closed
for repairs and that he would obtain a license for them. The supreme
court, after asserting that fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, found the record to reveal that the plaintiff had at most asserted
that he knew of no reason why the defendants could not obtain a license
and that he had made no misrepresentations concerning the reasons for
the closure. Nonetheless, the court readily concluded that the defendants'
principal cause, the acquisition of "a going bar-lounge business for their
continued operation," was known or should have been known to the plain-
tiff, and on this basis rescinded the lease and sale.'28
Because the plaintiff knew that the license had been revoked and may
well have known that the odds of reissuance were remote, the decision
is certainly appropriate. On the other hand, if the plaintiff had had a
125. See generally, Comment, Seller's Express Warranty Giving Rise to a Redhibitory
Action-Article 2529 of the Louisiana Civil Code, 42 TUL. L. REv. 374 (1968).
126. See Palmer, Contractual Negligence in the Civil Law-The Evolution of a Defense
to Actions for Error, 50 TUL. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1975).
127. 284 So. 2d 892 (La. 1973).
128. Id. at 895.
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license and the local authorities had refused to permit operation to be
continued by the defendants, the court may very well have upheld the
agreement. The plaintiff, in probability, would be charged with an
awareness of the defendants' assumption that the authorities would per-
mit their operation. Nonetheless, the plaintiff could convincingly assert
that the defendants alone should bear the risk of the inaccuracy of this
assumption. In any event, an awareness of the inaccuracy of a very signifi-
cant assumption, in the instant case and in several others, 29 unquestionably
influenced principal cause identifications.
Error as to "Substance" and "Substantial Quality"
The Civil Code articles concerning error as to substance and substan-
tial quality have been utilized in several decisions involving the transfer
of rights to incorporeals. Knight v. Lanfear,"30 an 1844 supreme court
decision, is perhaps the first such case to classify an error as one as to
substance. The transferee of a United States Treasury Note sued for return
of the purchase price. The plaintiff established that the note had been
redeemed and marked "cancelled" by the government and was thereafter
"purloined" and chemically treated so that the inscription of cancellation
was expunged. However, he was unable to show that the transferors were
aware of these occurrences at the time of the transfer. Additionally, the
transfer was accomplished under an indorsement "without recourse." The
defendants contended that the government was delinquent in advising the
public after discovering the misappropriation of the note and that this
tardiness together with other of its actions estopped the government from
asserting that the note had been discharged. The defendants further con-
tended that their responsibility should be determined by the Civil Code
articles regulating assignments and that these articles impose a warranty
only as to the existence of indebtedness and not a warranty that the debtor
will voluntarily pay. The court assumed that the conduct of the govern-
ment entitled the transferee of the note to "demand its amount from the
government." It nonetheless concluded that there was "error as to the
substance of the object of the sale" and held that the transferee was
entitled to judgment for the amount he had paid.
The decision is unquestionably well based. Normally, a transferor
should be required to bear the risk that a seemingly genuine instrument
is actually a cancelled instrument from which evidence of cancellation has
been fraudulently removed. The assignment articles upon which the defen-
dants relied prescribe this risk allocation when the maker of such an in-
strument is entitled to assert his discharge.' 3 These assignment articles
129. See, e.g., Guaranty Sav. Assurance Co. v. Uddo, 386 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1980); Boehmer Sales Agency v. Russo, 99 So. 2d 475 (La. App. Orl. 1958).
130. 7 Rob. 172 (La. 1844).
131. Civil Code art. 2646 retains almost the exact language of its antecedent, article
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should not be construed to require a contrary allocation because of the
possibility of an estoppel upon which the maker's responsibility might
be based. Thus, unless the presence of a "without recourse" indorsement
is regarded as basis for allocating practically all risks to the transferee,'32
he should be protected from an extremely remote risk which he obviously
did not perceive.
The court in Tircuit v. Gottlieb'" also referred to error as to substance
in a transaction involving the transfer of an incorporeal. The controversy
concerned the significance of an agreement to apply the "value" of what
was believed to be a highway commission certificate to the payment of
the purchase price of a new vehicle. The supposed highway commission
certificate was subsequently discovered to be a certificate for the participa-
tion in the proceeds of a series of highway bonds which had no "value."
Upon making this discovery, the car dealer refused to deliver a new vehicle
without other arrangements being made for payment of the cash value
which had been attributed to the certificate. The buyer, contending that
he was entitled to a new vehicle without the necessity of making any further
commitment, brought suit. The court, citing the Civil Code articles con-
cerning error as to substance and error as to substantial quality,"' held
that there was a "mutual error" as to the nature of the certificate enti-
tling the car dealer to rescind the agreement in the absence of a tender
of a valid highway certificate or its value in cash.'3
Albert E. Briede & Son, Inc. v. Murphy'36 is perhaps the most in-
triguing case dealing with the present topic. The opinion concerns a funeral
home's claim against a widow who arranged for her husband's interment.
The controversy arose when an insurance company which had issued both
a burial insurance and a life insurance policy to the deceased refused to
honor a claim for proceeds under the life insurance policy. The funeral
home, which had received the policies from the widow on the day funeral
arrangements were made, brought suit for what it viewed as the portion
of the contract price not extinguished by the proceeds of the burial policy.
The widow, on the other hand, asserted that the funeral home had agreed
to accept the policies themselves in exchange for its rendition of services.
The court found that the widow's selection of a casket more expensive
2616 of the Civil Code of 1825, which read: "He who sells a debt or an incorporeal right,
warrants its existence at the time of the transfer, though no warranty be mentioned in the
deed."
132. Under an express provision of present law, certain warranties are recognized in
transfers of negotiable instruments under "without recourse" indorsements. See LA. R.S.
10:3-417(2)-(3) (1983). Furthermore, the French text of article 2616 of the Civil Code of
1825, the antecedent of Civil Code article 2646, provided that the transferor guaranteed
the existence of the right even if the transfer were made sans garantie.
133. 151 So. 428 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
134. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1842-1844, quoted supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
135. 151 So. at 430.
136. 19 So. 2d 914 (La. App. Orl. 1944).
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than the one for which the burial insurance proceeds would pay was
preceded by an examination of both policies by the funeral home's direc-
tor. The court also found that the director had assured the widow that
the policies would provide ample proceeds for the more expensive funeral
she selected. It also observed that the funeral home's form contract docu-
ment, which bore the widow's signature, included a notation by the director
indicating that forty-three dollars was owed the widow. With reference
to the funeral home's contention that the director had merely agreed to
attempt to collect any proceeds from the policies and to apply them to
the extinguishment of indebtedness, the court stated:
There can be no doubt that ordinarily if in the payment of
an obligation something is given which both parties believe to be
of a certain value and later it develops that it has no value, there
has been a mistake of fact in the subject matter of the agree-
ment, and it may be set aside and demand for payment made.' 37
The court cited the Tircuit case and the Civil Code articles concerning
errors as to substance and substantial quality as authority for this princi-
ple and then sought to explain why the principle was inappropriate in
the situation before it. The court first observed that the same individual
was president of the funeral home and the insurance company and noted
that the evidence suggested that he was the sole shareholder of each. The
court next emphasized that the burial policy would not pay for services
rendered by any establishment except that of the plaintiff. The court then
concluded that the widow was justified in believing that the policies were
unconditionally accepted as payment for the funeral bill regardless of the
actual intentions of the funeral director. Finally, the court expressed con-
fidence that the director's actions had induced the widow to select the
more costly funeral.
The court's articulation of a general rule and its bases for finding
it inapplicable are all of interest. Discussion of its general proposition
will be deferred until the remainder of the related cases have been ex-
amined. As to the proffered bases for finding the general rule inap-
plicable, it is difficult to determine the significance the court attributed
to each of the factors it identified. Common ownership of the funeral
home and the insurance company seems a questionable basis for
distinguishing the situation. Assuming, however, that common ownership
does provide basis for distinction, it would only be relevant in determin-
ing the significance of any representations by the director concerning the
existence of insurance coverage.' 38 The provision in the burial policy restrict-
137. Id. at 915.
138. If, for instance, the funeral director is regarded as an employee of an enterprise
providing both funerals and insurance, there is greater basis for attaching legal significance
to his assertions concerning the existence of insurance coverage than there would be if his
enterprise devoted its energies exclusively to the provision of funeral services.
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ing coverage to services performed by the plaintiff funeral home seems
relevant only insofar as it might provide additional justification for the
widow's reliance upon the director's assessments concerning the existence
of life insurance coverage. The remaining two factors, however, unques-
tionably have relevance in risk allocation. If the widow had a reasonable
basis for perceiving the transaction as one in which the assignment of
the policies constituted the entirety of her performance, the court's deci-
sion is rational and is reasonably supported by the Civil Code.' 9 The
director's notation concerning the cash policy and a balance owed to her,
however, need not be regarded as basis for recognizing a contractual com-
mitment unaffected by the funeral director's erroneous assumption as to
the existence of an insurer's liability. In other words, classification of the
arrangement as an exchange of services for an assignment of rights as
opposed to the rendition of services for a price does not preclude the
recognition of rescission through error analysis.' ° This is not to say,
however, that assertions as to the existence of coverage are not germane
to the allocation of the risk of their inaccuracy. Such assertions, at a
minimum, can buttress a decision to recognize the erroneous assumption
as to coverage as a basis for rescinding the agreement, no matter how
it is characterized. Further, if rescission were recognized and an unjust
enrichment claim were asserted by the funeral home, the misrepresenta-
tion could be regarded as justification for the enrichment. Such an ap-
proach could thus support an outcome like that reached by the court
through its recognition of a contract unaffected by error.
In Ashley v. Schmalinski,"'" the Louisiana Supreme Court classified
erroneous assumptions concerning the attributes of immovable property
as errors affecting substance. The party who erred concerning the prop-
erty she acquired obtained judgment rescinding the transaction. However,
the decision was clearly predicated upon the occurrence of fraudulent
misrepresentations designed to induce plaintiff's erroneous beliefs. A real
estate agent employed by plaintiff, with the assistance of a real estate
agent engaged by defendant, fraudulently led the plaintiff to believe that
the defendant's land was rich with timber and convenient to a railroad
and would thus be suitable for cultivation if the timber were harvested.
Further, the defendant was found to have at least suspected that plain-
tiff's agent was deceiving her as to the property's characteristics, and the
court concluded that the defendant must be treated as one having actual
139. The Civil Code articles concerning interpretation of agreements include articles 1957
and 1958, which permit resolution of "doubt or obscurity" in accordance with the percep-
tions of one of the contracting parties. However, these articles assume some core of com-
mon understanding, and determining just what range of misunderstandings were contemplated
by these articles is difficult.
140. Recall, for example, that Civil Code article 2646, quoted supra note 131, establishes
a warranty as to an incorporeal's existence in contracts of assignment.
141. 46 La. Ann. 499, 15 So. 1 (1894).
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knowledge of the fraud. The court's syllabus,' 4 2 along with its observa-
tion that parties must as a general rule inform themselves as to property
they are acquiring, further illustrates that the decision was keyed to the
occurrence of impermissible activity.
Jefferson Truck Equipment Co. v. Guarisco Motor Co. ' contains
an interesting discussion concerning errors as to substance and the
availability of relief grounded upon "unilateral error." The error involved,
however, was not classified as one affecting substance but as one affect-
ing principal cause. The plaintiff contended that a unilateral error pro-
vided no basis for rescission. In refuting this contention, the court refer-
red to Civil Code articles 1842-1844 and observed that article 1843 ex-
pressly recognizes the possibility of relief where only one party labors under
error as to an item's substance. The court then stated:
We see no valid basis for distinguishing between an error as
to substance, error as to a substantial quality, and error as to
a quality which is the principal cause of a contract. We conclude,
therefore, that unilateral error in any one of these respects con-
stitutes ground for rescission of an agreement.'
Mechanical application of the court's statement would result in the
availability of relief in any instance where an error could be classified
as one as to substance or substantial quality. For example, if parties con-
template different contractual objects, relief might be available without
regard to the reasonableness of the perceptions of the parties because er-
ror as to the identity of the contractual object has several times been
classified as error as to substance. ' 5 However, it is uncertain whether
the Jefferson Truck court would espouse this position. It was concerned
with a situation in which the party seeking to uphold the transaction was
not only aware of the assumption upon which the complaining party based
its claim for rescission but also was aware that this assumption was
erroneous. Additionally, the error was classified as one affecting prin-
cipal cause. Thus, the statement concerning the availability of relief in
the case of unilateral error as to substance could well have been made
with similar controversies in mind. Nonetheless, the decision will certain-
ly be cited in future controversies involving erroneous assumptions which
might be classified as errors affecting substance or substantial quality.
In Arbutnot, Latham & Co. v. Cage Drew Co.,' the court rejected
a contention that the alleged error affected a substantial quality of a right
which the defendant had agreed to acquire. The defendant refused to fulfill
its commitment to purchase various assets, including the registered
142. 46 La. Ann. at 500.
143. 250 So. 2d 211 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
144. Id. at 216.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
146. 6 Orl. App. 374 (La. 1909).
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trademark of a coffee company in receivership, and the receivers sought
specific performance. The defendant contended that corporations were not
entitled to register trademarks under Louisiana statutes 4 7 as it had
originally believed when the parties entered into the agreement. The court
expressed strong belief that corporations were entitled to avail themselves
of the protections afforded by the statutes in question. It concluded,
however, that the resolution of this question was not necessary to the
disposition of the controversy. The court examined the statutes in ques-
tion and concluded that they did not "purport to give to the one register-
ing such trade mark any greater right of property therein than he would
have had without such registry, or deny to any one who fails to register
a trade mark any right or remedy which he would have had, had the
statute not been passed."" ' 8 The court further observed that the statutes
added little to the preexisting remedies available to victims of infringe-
ment. The court thus justified its conclusion that "the property right in
a trade mark and its principal value as an asset are wholly independent
of the provisions""49 of the legislation in question. Through this analysis,
the court determined that the defendant's assumption as to the applicability
of the statutes to trade marks of corporations, even if erroneous, did
not bear upon a substantial quality: that is, the error did not affect a
quality giving the right its greatest value, and thus provided no basis for
rescission.
The supreme court in Freligh v. Miller'5 ° found an error as to a
substantial quality. A partner who had extinguished partnership in-
debtedness demanded contribution from one who had acquired a portion
of another partner's interest. The defendant resisted the demand on the
basis of misrepresentations concerning the existence of a "lucrative" part-
nership asset and insurance coverage protecting against the venture's most
significant risk. The court found that these misrepresentations had been
made by one of plaintiff's partners and probably by the partner who had
transferred a portion of his interest to the defendant. Although the
transferor had unquestionably been aware that the representations had
been made, the opinion indicates that the transferor believed the represen-
tations to be true and that the plaintiff was unaware that they had been
made. The court concluded that the plaintiff's rights could be no greater
than the transferor's and ruled that a "contract made under such cir-
cumstances could not be binding as between the parties, because the error
bore upon a substantial quality of the thing."'"' The court emphasized
that the two misrepresentations were so significant with reference to the
enterprise that it could safely conclude that the transferee would not have
147. The provisions in question were included in Act 49 of 1898.
148. 6 Orl. App. at 375.
149. Id.
150. 16 La. Ann. 418 (1862).
151. Id. at 420.
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Principal cause language has at times been employed in dcaling with
parties who assert different understandings as to a commitment they
endeavored to express. Ouachita Air Conditioning v. Pierce' illustrates
this practice. The defendant requested a representative of plaintiff to
examine his home's malfuntioning central air conditioning system. After
examination, the plaintiff advised the defendant that two compressors re-
quired replacement and recommended the installation of a single larger
unit. The defendant agreed. A few hours after the installation, the defen-
dant viewed the unit and immediately telephoned the plaintiff to relate
that he had expected a unit manufactured by "York." The defendant
had not previously stated that he desired a York unit, and the plaintiff
had not advised that he intended to install an Amana unit. However,
all major components of the home's preexisting system were York pro-
ducts. Subsequently, another party installed a York unit, and the defen-
dant requested the plaintiff to retrieve the Amana it had provided. The
plaintiff refused and sued for the contract price. The plaintiff contended
that the defendant had expressed agreement to the installation of a four
ton unit of unspecified brand and thus that it had fulfilled its obligation
by installing a four ton unit having a cooling capacity equivalent to the
units replaced. The defendant asserted that he had assumed that the major
components in his home's complete York system would be replaced with
York products. Citing Civil Code article 2456, he contended that no con-
tract or sale was completed because there was never an agreement as to
the object of the sale. Alternatively, relying on Civil Code article 1843,
the defendant maintained that any contract recognized as a result of the
transaction was subject to rescission for error as to substance.
The court accepted both of the defendant's arguments in rejecting
the plaintiff's demand. Authority for the first proposition was found in
Civil Code articles 2439 and 2456. In upholding the defendant's second
contention, the court explained:
We are convinced that this case falls squarely under LSA-Civil
Code Article 1845, in that there was error of fact as to the quality
of the object, that is, the manufacturer of the unit, and that this
quality was a principal cause of making the contract from defen-
dant's standpoint. While the seller did not have actual knowledge
that this was a principal cause or motive it should be presumed
152. 270 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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that he knew it from the nature of the transaction and, therefore,
the test of Article 1826 is met. Although [plaintiff] was in good
faith, when he was confronted with a complete York system in
which a major component needed replacing he should have been
aware that without anything being said to the contrary, the buyer
would expect replacement with the same brand of unit. The trial
court was correct in setting aside the sale and rejecting plaintiff's
demands. 'I I
Because the court found the plaintiff unjustified in believing that the defen-
dant had consented to the installation of a brand other than York, the
decision is clearly consistent with the Civil Code. On the other hand, had
the defendant been found to have indicated willingness to pay for any
unit having capacity equivalent to the units being replaced, the court could
have held him obligated in accordance with plaintiff's perceptions.
The Code framers clearly envisaged situations where a contractual
obligation would be recognized in accordance with the perceptions of one
party even though the perceptions of the other did not fully coincide.
Civil Code articles 1957 and 1958, found within the Code section entitled,
"Of the Interpretation of Agreements," address situations in which there
is doubt or obscurity concerning an obligation. In its present form, arti-
cle 1957 provides that "[i]n a doubtful case the agreement is interpreted
against him who has contracted the obligation." Article 1958 continues:
"But if the doubt or obscurity arise for the want of necessary explana-
tion which one of the parties ought to have given, or from any other
negligence or fault of his, the construction most favorable to the other
party shall be adopted, whether he be obligor or obligee." The history
of article 1957 raises an interesting question concerning situations in which
doubt or obscurity cannot be attributed to negligence .or fault of either
party. "" For present purposes, however, the significant task is to identify
the range of misunderstandings which may be resolved in accordance with
the perceptions of one of the parties.
Civil Code article 1945 is relevant to this inquiry and provides in its
final subdivision: "[I]t is the common intent of the parties-that is, the
intention of all-that is to be sought for; if there was a difference in
this intent, there was no common consent and, consequently, no contract."
By describing willingness to incur responsibility as a requisite to contrac-
tual commitment, this article suggests that articles 1957 and 1958 have
153. Id. at 598.
154. In this situation, the literal terms of the present text of article 1957 prescribe an
interpretation in favor of the obligee of the ambiguous or obscure commitment. Because
the present text dates from an 1871 amendment to the Civil Code of 1870, the literal terms
of the present text should probably be given effect. The article's antecedents, however, in-
dicate basis for a contrary view. For the text of the antecedents, see 1972 COMPILED EDITION
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA art. 1957 (J. Dainow ed. 1973).
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but a limited sphere of operation. Thus, articles 1957 and 1958, which
clearly provide for the recognition of contractual commitment in some
respects at variance with the perceptions of a contracting party, were prob-
ably intended for situations in which the parties have actually agreed to
most of the details of the transaction. Under this view, a legal relation-
ship would not be recognized in accordance with the perceptions of one
party simply because his view is for some reason determined to be better
based. It would also be necessary that the relationship perceived by the
complaining party bear a substantial similarity to the relationship con-
templated by the party whose perceptions are judicially preferred. The
Civil Code, however, does not provide any additional criteria for deter-
mining when the requisite similarity is present. Nonetheless, certain con-
siderations seem reasonable bases for limiting the instances in which con-
tractual commitments can be recognized despite misunderstandings. For
example, in determining whether a party is to be required to render a
performance more onerous than the one he contemplated, the difference
between the cost of the performances should certainly be relevant. Similar-
ly, the utility to the obligee of a performance distinct from the perfor-
mance he contemplated should be considered, as should the market value
of the performances contemplated by each party. Additionally, the
occurrence of full or partial performance by one or both parties might
well play a significant role in resolving such problems.
In the situation presented in Ouachita Air Conditioning, the court
could have recognized the contractual commitment in accordance with the
perceptions of either the homeowner or the air conditioning contractor.
Because the homeowner sought only rescission and not the recognition
of a contractual commitment corresponding to his perceptions, the court
was only faced with a choice between the recognition of the arrangement
contemplated by the contractor and the denial of any contractual arrange-
ment at all. Because the homeowner did not specify the brand to be used
in replacing the deficient units, the contractor had a reasonable basis to
believe that it was not restricted to the brand of the units it was replac-
ing. Further, the contractor, as evidenced by its advertising practices,
specialized in the brand it ultimately installed. Thus, the court could have
viewed the homeowner as having agreed to the arrangement perceived by
the contractor.'" Then, under the construction of the Code suggested in
the preceding paragraph, it would have been necessary to determine
whether the performance rendered and the performance contemplated by
the homeowner were sufficiently similar to justify contractual commitment.
The court did not deny the theoretical possibility of recognizing the
relationship asserted by the contractor. Instead, it concluded that a
homeowner having a complete York system was amply justified in assum-
155. The court, however, found the homeowner to have been unaware of the contrac-
tor's specialty. 270 So. 2d at 596.
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ing that a major component would be replaced by a York product in
the absence of an express understanding to the contrary. Because the ex-
pense involved was considerable and the brand of the replacement unit
would be important to most homeowners, the court reasonably conclud-
ed that a professional contractor should make his intentions clear to the
consumer. The court thus reasonably refused to resolve the ambiguity in
accordance with the understanding of the contractor.
The court's opinion, however, is distinctive in employing principal
cause language in concluding that the homeowner was not responsible for
the agreed price. The court assumed the existence of a contract and then
concluded that it was subject to rescission due to the homeowner's belief
concerning the brand the contractor was obligated to install, a belief
classified as a principal cause.', In all probability, the effort of the redac-
tors of the Code to describe a concept of principal cause was in no way
directed to the resolution of misunderstandings as to commitments to be
incurred. To the contrary, the concept seems directed to the identifica-
tion of erroneous assumptions providing basis for rescission in situations
in which each party's communications have been understood as they were
intended.'" Nonetheless, the resolution of ambiguities and the identifica-
tion of underlying assumptions as principal causes involve very similar
inquiries. If contractual commitment is to be recognized despite ambigui-
ty as to its terms, a court must find a rational basis for recognizing a
relationship corresponding to the perceptions of one party as opposed to
the other.' Similarly, under the Code's concept of principal cause, an
underlying assumption is not recognized as basis for rescission unless cir-
cumstances provide a reasonable basis for recognizing that the assump-
tion was being made.'" Thus, despite the circularity of resolving the am-
biguity against the homeowner to recognize a contract and then regarding
the same ambiguity as basis for rescission, the court engaged in the analysis
prescribed by the interpretation articles, that is, it considered the possibility
of circumstances which might provide basis for obligating one as he was
perceived to have been obligated by the other.
Gibert v. Cook'" utilizes principal cause language in addressing a pro-
blem somewhat similar to that involved in Ouachita Air Conditioning.
The plaintiff agreed to furnish and install a specified number of "ready-
built" kitchen cabinets in the defendant's residence. After a number of
these cabinets had been installed, the defendant became dissatisfied with
the installation and forbade further efforts of the plaintiff. He then hired
another to remove and store the cabinets that had been installed. The
156. Id. at 597.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
158. See LA. CrV. CODE arts. 1945-1962 ("Of the Interpretation of Agreements").
159. See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
160. 144 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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plaintiff sued for the value of the cabinets actually installed, a sum less
than the agreed price for the entire job. The defendant's primary com-
plaint concerning the performance and the basis of his defense was the
plaintiff's inability to fit the cabinets within the available wallspace of
the kitchen. The installation on one side of a kitchen window had
necessitated the removal of two inches of the window trim. Similarly,
removal of three inches of trim on the other side was contemplated in
order to make room for the cabinets destined for that side of the room.
The defendant contended that the plaintiff owed a contractual commit-
ment to furnish cabinets which would fit within preexisting wallspace and
thus that installation accomplished through removal of the window trim
did not constitute performance. The plaintiff, on the other hand, asserted
that the removal of the window trim was a contractually permissible means
of installing an agreed number of ready-built cabinets which could not
otherwise be fit on the kitchen walls.' 61 However, the plaintiff acknowl-
edged that he had been aware that trim removal would be necessary when
he agreed to do the job and that he had not advised the defendant of
this necessity.
The district court had concluded "that the fitting of the cabinets
without cutting the window trims was the principal cause, or motive, of
the contract and that the parties had not agreed thereon, so there was
not a meeting of the minds.""' 2 The fourth circuit, after approving the
lower court's conclusion that the defendant would not have agreed to the
installation if he had known that it would entail removal of window trim,
affirmed "the conclusion that perfectly fitted cabinets was the principal
cause, or motive, of the contract""' 3 and declared the contract to be
invalid.
The court's rejection of the plaintiff's demand was well based. A
homeowner who is advised that a certain number of ready-built cabinets
can be installed in his kitchen will normally assume that the installation
will be accomplished without resort to methods like those employed in
Gibert. Thus, in the absence of factors strongly indicating that existing
wallspace must be enlarged, the homeowner's expectations should be
honored, at least to the extent of denying the existence of an obligation
to receive a performance necessitating an unanticipated enlargement.
Furthermore, circumstances such as those involved in Gibert provide
ample basis for the recognition of a contractual. commitment to install
in accordance with the perceptions of the homeowner. The homeowner
in Gibert, however, asserted no claim which might have necessitated the
recognition of such a commitment. Thus, the court was only required
to determine that the homeowner did not have to accept the performance
161. Id. at 684.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 685.
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rendered by the plaintiff. In so doing, the fourth circuit, like the second
circuit in Ouachita Air Conditioning, utilized principal cause language.
The principal cause concept, as previously suggested, was probably not
designed to deal with situations in which parties have different under-
standings as to the performance commitment incurred. If, in such situa-
tions, one party is not to be obligated in accordance with the perceptions
of the other, it is somewhat awkward to describe an agreement subject
to rescission because of error as to principal cause. Nonetheless, when
the courts in Ouachita Air Conditioning and Gibert identified principal
causes, they expressed their conclusions that the expectations of the com-
plaining parties were reasonably based. They also impliedly indicated that
a party whose perceptions are not as well founded may be obligated to
receive or render a performance in some ways at variance with the one
he contemplated.
In Custom Builders & Supply v. Revels,'6 the court considered the
significance of a misunderstanding as to the price of certain construction
work. The defendant, a homeowner, requested the plaintiff construction
company to submit a bid to perform renovation and additional construc-
tion in accordance with a set of specifications prepared by another. Pur-
suant to this request, an authorized representative of the company prepared
a proposal which was subsequently signed by the homeowner. Thereafter,
several interim payments were made, and substantially all of the specified
work was accomplished. A dispute then developed as to the sum to be
paid for the work. The construction company asserted that the document
signed by both parties defined a "cost plus" arrangement whereby it was
to be reimbursed its costs and receive a $2,000 return. The homeowner,
to the contrary, contended that the document evidenced the construction
company's commitment to perform the entire job for $16,500. In his opin-
ion, the $2,000 figure was not a guaranteed but a projected return which,
together with the contractor's estimated costs of $14,500, explained the
basis for an unconditional commitment to perform the work for $16,500.
The trial court held that the contractor was obligated to perform the
entire job for $16,500. Because the court of appeal concluded that each
party had perceived the arrangement differently, it held that "there was
no meeting of the minds, no consent, and . . . no contract."'16 ' The court
then resolved the conflict in accordance with principles of quantum meruit
by defining the homeowner's enrichment as the enhanced value of his
property attributable to the construction. Because the contractor's costs
exceeded the enhancement so computed, judgment was rendered for the
amount of the enhancement minus the sums previously paid.
In assessing the opinion, it should be noted that the court found the
document ambiguous on its face. Nonetheless, the decision is significant
164. 310 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
165. Id. at 866.
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in its refusal to resolve the ambiguity as to the price of the construction
in favor of one party as opposed to the other. Several factors may have
influenced the court's decision. First, there was great disparity between
the sums the homeowner and the contractor alleged to be due.' 6 Second,
the document, while possibly subject to the homeowner's alleged under-
standing, would be understood by most to describe a cost plus
arrangement.' 6 Third, the actual expenses of the contractor were approx-
imately seventy percent greater than the $14,500 it had estimated in the
document. '68
When construction has been completed and the price for which it was
to be done is ambiguous, factors which might justify a resolution in
accordance with the perceptions of one of the parties must be considered.
A property owner might be unable to afford a price higher than the one
he understood, and in instances where he is financially well situated, the
construction at a higher price might not be economically justifiable. On
the other hand, a contractor must endeavor to recoup expenses and receive
a return, ends which often would be frustrated if he were compensated
with a sum less than he contemplated. Thus, one might expect a con-
siderable judicial inclination to resolve ambiguity in favor of one party
when his perceptions appear better based.'6 9
The court's refusal to recognize a contract in Revels may have been
influenced by an unarticulated concern for a $10,000 disparity between
the contractor's estimated and actual expenditures. Arguably, the con-
tractor incurred an obligation to estimate probable costs with a degree
of accuracy not afforded by an estimate which was only fifty-eight per-
cent of actual cost." ' Further, the homeowner's mistaken assumption as
to the probable range of costs, an assumption attributable to fault of
the contractor, could provide basis for rescission grounded upon error.
Thus, even if the language of the document might more reasonably be
understood to describe a relationship whereby the owner's cost might ex-
ceed $16,500, the situation was not ripe for recognition of a commitment
requiring the homeowner to pay a sum far greater than he had reasonably
contemplated.
On the other hand, the contractor had understood that it was to be
166. Disregarding interim payments made by the homeowner, the homeowner viewed
his obligation as $16,500, the contract price, plus $2,860.63 for approved construction not
included in the original contract. Under the contractor's view, the homeowner, disregarding
interim payments, owed $29,752.37, a sum including compensation for the construction not
originally planned.
167. The document is reproduced in the opinion. 310 So. 2d at 864.
168. This computation was accomplished by deducting the $2,860.63 attributable to ad-
ditional construction from the $27i752.37 figure advanced by the contractor as its total cost.
169. Civil Code article 2315 provides ample basis for such a responsibility.




reimbursed its costs and had reasonable basis for believing that the
homeowner had understood this also. Thus, a clear basis existed for
recognizing an obligation of the homeowner to pay a sum exceeding the
$16,500 limit he sought to impose. Under these circumstances, the denial
of a contractual relationship and the measurement of enrichment in terms
of enhanced property value were probably the only workable means to
a just result. However, in light of the unique circumstances of the con-
troversy, the decision's implications for resolution of ambiguities are prob-
ably limited.
North Development Co. v. McClure"' also involved an alleged
misunderstanding as to the sum for which work was to be performed.
The project included installation of streets and drainage structures and
grading and dressing of lots in a subdivision development. The subcon-
tractor, who completed the work in question, alleged a portion of the
contract price to be a function of the total amount of earth moved and
materials utilized. The general contractor, on the other hand, asserted that
the subcontractor had agreed to perform the designated work for a lump
sum and thus that quantities of earth and materials were without
significance. Prior to the execution of the written contract, the developer's
project engineer had supplied thesubcontractor with a copy of plans and
specifications along with an estimate of the quantities of work to be per-
formed and the materials required.- The subcontractor then prepared a
bid proposal quoting "the unit cost" of each phase of work he proposed
to undertake. This proposal, addressed to the project engineer, stated a
"total estimated cost" of $57,814.30. When the written contract was
executed by the contractor and subcontractor several months later, the
project engineer's plans and specifications were referred to and the
$57,814.30 figure was expressed and apparently was described as the con-
tract price.' The subcontractor, however, alleged that he signed a copy
of his bid proposal at the time of the execution of the contract document'73
and that he accordingly understood the agreement to provide for com-
pensation in accordance with unit prices.
The trial court, after stating that the document should be construed
against its preparer (the general contractor), concluded that each party
had a different understanding and thus that there was no "meeting of
the minds." It accordingly ruled that the contract was "vitiated." Then,
in the absence of a contract, it considered the subcontractor's claim for
labor and materials and concluded that the contractor had been enriched
171. 276 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
172. The language of the written instrument clearly provided some support for the general
contractor's position that the subcontractor was committed to perform for a lump sum.
The instrument, however, is not reproduced in the court's decision.
173. The opinion does not indicate whether the general contractor disputed the subcon-
tractor's assertion that a copy of the bid proposal was signed at that time.
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by $73,634.90, the exact sum the subcontractor had alleged to be due
under the contract. The second circuit affirmed the decision.
The appellate court's opinion, however, seems substantially influenced
by a factor which had not been expressly identified by the trial court
as a basis for its decision. After the subcontractor had submitted his bid
proposal based upon the plans and specifications furnished by the project
engineer, this engineer obtained FHA approval to lower the elcvation of
the entire subdivision, and under new plans and specifications designed
to implement this change, the amount of excavation necessary for street
installation was significantly increased. Neither the subcontractor nor the
general contractor had knowledge of this change at the time they signed
the written agreement. Thus, apart from any ambiguity as to price, the
change in specifications in itself provided basis for rescission, and the
court of appeal identified "mutual error of fact in regard to the extent
of the work to be performed and the payments to be received therefor"' 7
as error precluding the recognition of contractual commitment.
Because the general contractor was unaware of the changed specifica-
tions at the time the written document was signed, and thus had no basis
for believing the subcontractor to have promised to perform anything other
than the work specified on the original plans, the court was certainly cor-
rect in concluding that the subcontractor incurred no obligation to per-
form the work defined by the modified plans. The subcontractor's per-
formance, however, presented the possibility of finding the subsequent
creation of a contractual relationship. For instance, had the general con-
tractor learned of the modified specifications before the subcontractor
made substantial progress in his performance, the court could have found
the general contractor to have impliedly consented to compensate the sub-
contractor in accordance with the unit prices. If, on the other hand, the
general contractor had no knowledge of the modifications prior to substan-
tial performance by the subcontractor, then a responsibility to compen-
sate according to unit prices could not be recognized on a truly consen-
sual basis. The court of appeal discussed neither the contractor's knowledge
nor the possibility of finding an implied agreement to pay unit prices.
Instead, it accepted the trial court's conclusion that unit prices fairly
measured the contractor's benefit.
In Clement v. Sneed Brothers,'7 ' the Louisiana Supreme Court found
the language of a written instrument to be ambiguous, and, in the absence
174. The court later addressed the possibility that its conclusion of mutual error might
be erroneous and concluded that judgment should be rendered for the subcontractor even
if the general contractor had been aware of the plan modifications at the time the contract
was signed. It stated: "Even assuming there was error only on the part of [the subcon-
tractor], the same result would obtain as unilateral error of fact is sufficient to abrogate
a contract." 276 So. 2d at 400.
175. 240 La. 48, 121 So. 2d 235 (1960).
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of extrinsic evidence disclosing a mutual intention, it concluded that the
supposed agreement was void. The instrument, styled a "Side Letter-of
Agreement," supplemented a standard form mineral lease. It expressed
a commitment of the lessees to "drill or cause to be drilled a well on
• ..land [of the lessor] or on lands that would be pooled therewith." ' ,6
After the passage of the time specified in the document for the commence-
ment of drilling, the lessor sued for dissolution of the lease and damages.
The trial court decreed the lease to be terminated and awarded $60,000
as damages. On appeal, the lessees contended that the document evidenced
an obligation of the lessor to consent to voluntary unitization and that
her arbitrary refusal to sign unitization contracts made their compliance
with the drilling commitment impossible. The lessor, to the contrary,
asserted that she incurred no such commitment and that the lessees' drill-
ing commitment was unconditional. The court found that the language
of the lease did not fully support the contention of either party. In par-
ticular, it noted the existence of provisions negating the existence of an
unconditional drilling commitment by lessees and the absence of language
expressly obligating the lessor to consent to reasonable proposals for volun-
tary unitization. Because the parties had entertained different intentions,
the court concluded that no contractual agreement had been reached and
consequently reversed the judgment awarding damages for violation of
contractual commitment.
Because the lessees did not persist in asserting a claim dependent upon
the recognition of the contract they alleged to exist, the court was not
called upon to determine whether the lease could be upheld despite am-
biguity and differing perceptions of the parties. However, the opinion sug-
gests that an ambiguous instrument might be construed in accordance with
the perceptions of the party whose perceptions are thought to be better
grounded, and the concurring opinion of Justice McCaleb indicates that
he, for one, would have been willing to adopt such an approach. 7 '
Lyons Milling Co. v. Cusimano" 8 is another decision refusing to
recognize contractual commitment because of ambiguity in the communica-
tions through which agreement was thought to have been achieved. The
plaintiff, a flour miller in Kansas, sued the defendant, a macaroni
manufacturer in New Orleans, for damages for the breach of a contract
176. 240 La. at 53, 121 So. 2d at 236.
177. In his concurring opinion, Justice McCaleb indicated that he believed the terms
of the document to support the position of the lessees that the lessor was to include her
lands in reasonable pooling arrangements. Thus, if her refusal was not to be classified as
a breach, he would at least regard it as an occurrence relieving the lessees of their drilling
commitment. Hence, he would have recognized the claim of the lessees to maintain the
lease without payment of delay rentals. Because the lessees had abandoned their claim for
that relief, Justice McCaleb concurred in the judgment reversing the lower court's judgment
awarding damages for breach of contract. 240 La. at 59-62, 121 So. 2d at 238-40.
178. 161 La. 198, 108 So. 414 (1926).
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to purchase flour. The defendant contended that the flour shipped by
the plaintiff did not meet the description of the flour he had ordered.
When the defendant ordered through the plaintiff's sales representative
in New Orleans, he emphasized that he desired to purchase only flour
milled by a particular mill located in Lyons, Kansas. The defendant
specified flour from this facility because its product in the past had had
a gluten content well suited for the preparation of macaroni, whereas flour
from another of Lyons' mills had proved deficient in qualities important
in macaroni production. The plaintiff's sales representative acknowledged
that the defendant had made his position clear and that he had endeavored
to specify flour from the Lyons, Kansas mill in his telegram to the plain-
tiff relating the defendant's order. The sales representative's telegram was
not introduced into evidence. However, Lyons' letter of confirmation was
introduced, and it described the sale as one of "Telegram" flour (Lyons
Milling Company's brand name), "f.o.b. Lyons, freight allowed." When
flour not milled in Lyons, Kansas was shipped to New Orleans, the defen-
dant refused to accept it. The plaintiff then insisted that the flour was
the same quality as flour from its Lyons, Kansas mill, and the defendant
expressed willingness to accept it if a test he proposed showed it to have
the gluten content requisite for making macaroni. The plaintiff refused
to permit such testing, and, after selling the flour to another, sued for
damages.
The supreme court did not regard the New Orleans sales represen-
tative to be empowered to obligate the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant's
relationship with the plaintiff depended upon the legal consequences to
be attributed to the order submitted by the sales representative to the
plaintiff and the plaintiff's letter of confirmation to the defendant. The
court concluded that the defendant was not unreasonable in believing that
the plaintiff had expressed commitment to ship flour from its Lyons, Kan-
sas mill. Accordingly, the court held that "the error or misunderstanding
of the parties permitted either of them to avoid the contract."' 79
The court's resolution of the controversy was certainly correct. Because
the defendant's offer to the plaintiff was formulated by the plaintiff's
New Orleans "sales representative" who testified that the message expressed
willingness to buy flour milled by a specific facility, the situation was
inappropriate for recognizing a contractual commitment defined in accor-
dance with the plaintiff's perceptions. On the other hand, the recognition
of a contractual relationship in accordance with the defendant's percep-
tions might well have been justified. The court's emphasis on the
reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs and its express reference to Civil
Code articles permitting the recognition of contractual commitments in
179. 161 La. at 206, 108 So. at 416.
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cases of ambiguous expression'80 indicate that the court might well have
been willing to recognize the contractual arrangement perceived by the
defendant despite the plaintiff's contrary understanding. However, because
the defendant sought only to defeat the plaintiff's claim for damages,
the court was not called upon to discuss the possibility of recognizing
such an arrangement.
The court in Talley v. Blake'8 ' considered whether individuals signing
documents did so as parties to the transaction or as representatives of
another they sought to obligate. One of the documents, a promissory note
signed by both defendants, in no way mentioned the corporation for whom
the defendants allegedly acted. The other document, an act of sale of
corporate stock, clearly identified the defendants as purchasers. The plain-
tiff obtained judgment against both defendants in solido in accordance
with the terms of the promissory note. The defendants, both at trial and
on appeal, contended that they had not intended to acquire the plaintiff's
stock in their own right, but only for the corporation whose shares were
being sold, and thus that they did not intend to incur personal liability
by signing the note. The plaintiff maintained that he had viewed the defen-
dants as the purchasers of the stock he sold and thus that he regarded
their signatures on the note to evidence their personal obligations.
The court of appeal concluded that the defendants had failed to prove
their lack of intention to obligate themselves personally. Further, the
court asserted that the defendants would not have avoided responsibility
by demonstrating the absence of such an intention, because the plaintiff
was not required to presume that their principal motive was to purchase
stock without incurring personal liability. Thus, the court used principal
cause language to support the recognition of contractual commitment in
accordance with the terms of unambiguous written instruments. Further-
more, if the note in question were negotiable, then, under the express
provision of the Louisiana Revised Statutes,' the presence of defendants'
names without identification of their purported principal would preclude
introduction of evidence of intention to act only in a representative
capacity.
Errors as to Substance
Because the Civil Code articles addressing error as to "substance"
could well provide basis for attaching legal significance to certain assump-
180. The court quoted Civil Code articles 1957 and 1958, quoted supra p. 923. Civil
Code article 2474 was also quoted. It provides: "The seller is bound to explain himself
clearly respecting the extent of his obligations: any obscure or ambiguous clause is con-
strued against him."
181. 322 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
182. LA. R.S. 10:3-403 (1983).
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tions which would not be apparent to perceptive co-contractants, the ap-
pellate cases concerning these articles warrant careful consideration. The
following discussion concerns the cases addressing error in terms of
substance and several factually similar cases in which this term was not
employed. Cases concerning misunderstanding as to the identity of the
contractual object provide the first topic of discussion. Thereafter, the
decisions involving ambiguity in the expression of contractual commitments
receive attention.
Because the Civil Code articles concerning error as to substance ad-
dress assumptions concerning attributes of mutually identified contractual
objects, it is initially surprising that a number of misunderstandings as
to the identity of contractual objects are discussed in terms of error as
to substance. This practice can be explained by the absence of codal ar-
ticles expressly addressing such misunderstandings as to identity of ob-
jects and the undeniable susceptibility of existing provisions concerning
substance to a fortiori extension. Further, the earliest Louisiana cases refer-
ring to error as to substance in this context were decided under the Digest
or Civil Code of 1808, which, like the French Civil Code, made express
reference only to error as to the "person" of a co-contractant and error
as to "the very substance" of the contractual object.'83 Thus, to ground
relief upon error almost always required that the error be classified as
one affecting substance.
Berard's Heirs v. Berard'8' was perhaps the earliest case to employ
such an approach in the case of misunderstanding as to the identity of
the contractual object. In that case, the defendant, the highest bidder at
the public sale of a succession asset, resisted his coheirs' demand for the
purchase price by contending that he had not intended to buy the asset
described in the proc's-verbal. This document described the inchoate title
to land under a "back concession." Evidence revealed, however, that the
decedent and his son, the defendant, had located and regarded as the
back concession land to which the decedent was not entitled under the
terms of the grant. Although not entirely clear from the report, the land
as located was probably surveyed as a succession asset, and this located
land, as opposed to lmnd clearly within the terms of the concession grant,
was examined by the appraisers of the succession. In any event, the court
concluded that the defendant's intention was to buy the tract which had
actually been located. It further found that this located land did not belong
to the succession and concluded that there was "error in the sale affec-
ting the substance of the thing sold." '85 Thus, the court rejected the de-
183. See supra note 19.
184. 2 La. 1 (1830). The controversy preceded the enactment of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825.
185. 2 La. at 4.
[Vol. 44
MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS
mand of defendant's coheirs to regulate the transaction in accordance with
the terms of the adjudication.
Upon initial consideration, the decision appears particularly signifi-
cant because bidders at a public sale should normally bear the risk of
inaccuracy of their assumptions as to the identity of assets sold. However,
the Berard situation is distinguishable. First, the litigation involved coheirs
who probably were aware of the location their ancestor had made.81 6
Second, the succession proceedings themselves may well have supported
the defendant's contention concerning the identity of the property involved
in the public sale. Finally, there may have been question as to whether
the succession was entitled to the land to which the back concession had
unquestionably pertained. ' Thus, apart from the case's vintage, the highly
unusual fact situation limits the implications of the decision for other con-
troversies involving misunderstandings as to the identity of contractual
objects.
Patterson v. Koops'8' also concerned the significance of misunder-
standing as to the identity of the object in a sale transaction. The seller
sought specific performance of an alleged contract for the transfer of lots
situated on Park Row. The defendant resisted the demand contending that
he had intended to purchase lots on City Park Row and thus that error
existed as to the subject of the contract. Both streets were located in what
the court termed a "newly opened residential section." The court described
City Park Row as an improved thoroughfare and Park Row as a blind
alley leading to the rear of the lots facing City Park Row. In addition
to the Park Row lots involved in the demand for specific performance,
the plaintiff also owned lots on City Park Row which bore "For Sale"
signs of plaintiff's brokers. The court found that the defendant believed
the document he signed to concern lots on City Park Row and that he
was unaware of the existence of Park Row. It also found that a clerk
employed by one of plaintiff's brokers had described Park Row and City
Park Row as two names for a single street. The court concluded that
there was no "meeting of the minds" and that the plaintiff's demand
for specific performance was properly denied.' 9 The articulated rationale
of the decision is not limited to situations in which the perceptions of
the party complaining of error are reasonably based. As in Berard,
however, the unusual circumstances of the case provide ready basis for
distinguishing future situations.
Lawrence v. Mount Zion Baptist Church9 is another decision re-
fusing to recognize contractual commitment where parties contemplated
186. Id. at 3.
187. Id. at 2.
188. 10 Orl. App. 266 (La. 1913).
189. Id. at 268.
190. 1 La. App. 404 (Orl. 1925).
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different contractual objects. The plaintiff, the owner of immovable prop-
erty, sought damages for the breach of an alleged purchase agreement.
The defendant resisted the demand by contending that it had intended
to purchase another tract. Evidence clearly established that the parties
had different tracts in mind. The misunderstanding began when the defen-
dant's pastor expressed interest in property bearing a real estate agency's
"For Sale" sign. The agent handling the transaction erroneously assumed
that the pastor was referring to the plaintiff's property, which was situated
on the same street approximately one block from the property the pastor
sought to purchase. As a result of this error, the agent had the pastor
sign a document describing the plaintiff's property instead of the prop-
erty the pastor and his church sought to acquire.
In the course of its opinion rejecting the plaintiff's demand for
damages, the court noted the absence of any evidence that the plaintiff's
property also bore a "For Sale" sign and the presence of testimony that
the municipal numbers upon the property which the defendant sought to
purchase were not readily apparent.' 9 This discussion and other comments
strongly suggest that the court believed the misunderstanding attributable
in significant part to the fault of the agency and that this fault was in
turn imputable to the plaintiff. However, the court expressly stated that
such determinations were unnecessary to resolution of the controversy.'92
In support of this position it quoted the language of a Louisiana Supreme
Court decision involving a factually dissimilar situation: "Error is error.
No matter by whom or what induced, it vitiates the consent; and without
consent, there can be no contract.".' 93 Thus, the case can certainly be
cited for the proposition that misunderstanding as to the identity of a
contractual object, without regard to the reasonableness of the parties'
perceptions, precludes the recognition of contractual commitment. As with
the previously discussed cases, however, the context of the court's pro-
nouncement should not be forgotten.
In Colas v. Donaldson,'94 a buyer demanded rescission of an act of
sale which did not include all of the land which he thought he was ac-
quiring. The act of sale had been preceded by a purchase agreement iden-
tifying the property by the municipal numbers of the house which the
buyer sought to purchase. After the act of sale had been executed and
the buyer had moved his family into the residence, activities of the city
prompted a survey which revealed that the property described in the act
of sale did not include all property within the four fences surrounding
the residence and that the residence itself was constructed partially upon
the property of adjoihing owners. The vendor, however, did have title
to all the property described in the act of sale. Although the vendor resisted
191. Id. at 406.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Newman v. Scarborough, 115 La. 860, 40 So. 248 (1905)).
194. 1 La. App. 389 (Orl. 1925).
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the demand for rescission, he admitted at trial that he had believed that
he was selling all property enclosed within the physical boundaries sur-
rounding the residence. The court had little difficulty reaching its deci-
sion to grant rescission. The court observed that the buyer's motive for
making the contract was wholly lacking and indicated that the buyer's
error could be classified as one as to the substance of the contract.' 9
Schmitz v. Peterson'96 involved a demand for rescission grounded upon
a realtor's misrepresentation as to the location of land. The transferors
had no interest in any of the land exhibited to the acquirer, but they
apparently believed that their rights pertained to this tract. The court,
however, did not discuss the implications of any such mutual error. It
simply grounded its decision on the occurrence of misrepresentation as
to the substance of the contract.1'9 This decision was cited as authority
for a judgment of rescission in Anzelmo v. Industrial City Co.'91 In
Anzelmo, the purchaser in a credit sale established that the property
described in the act of sale was not the property which had been shown
to him by a realtor who received a commission from the vendor. The
court ruled that testimony as to the agent's representations was admissi-
ble despite the presence of language in the agreement to sell negating the
authority of agents to make representations concerning matters not ad-
dressed in that document. This ruling, together with the court's syllabus
and its discussion of Schmitz, clearly establishes that the decision is
predicated upon misrepresentation. 99
The Civil Code articles addressing error as to substance have also
been discussed in several decisions concerning misunderstandings as to the
performance to be rendered. The most significant of these, Lyons Milling
Co. v. Cusimano 0° and Ouachita Air Conditioning v. Pierce,2"' have been
previously considered in the discussion of the jurisprudential concept of
error as to principal cause. The courts in both cases add support to their
decisions by reference to the articles concerning error as to substance.
Error as to the Nature of the Contract
The literal terms of Civil Code article 1841 deny the existence of a
contractual arrangement in all cases of misunderstanding as to the nature
195. Id. at 392. See also Franklin v. Evans, 315 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975);
Perdue v. Johnson, 35 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948). Both decisions concerned
misrepresentations as to land boundries made by real estate agents engaged by the sellers
of property, and both courts held that the buyers were entitled to rescind the contract of
sale because there was error as to substance.
196. 113 La. 134, 36 So. 915 (1904).
197. 113 La. at 138, 36 So. at 917.
198. 6 La. App. 79 (Orl. 1927).
199. Id. at 79, 81.
200. 161 La. 198, 108 So. 414 (1926), discussed supra text accompanying notes 178-80.




of the contract.2"2 Thus, if a misunderstanding can be classified as one
concerning the nature of the agreement, even an objectively unreasonable
perception could be viewed as a bar to the recognition of a contractual
relationship. The following discussion of appellate cases examines the
courts' categorizations of misunderstandings and seeks to determine the
extent to which the reasonableness of perceptions has affected the
availability of relief.
Ostensible Sales
In several cases, parties who signed instruments of conveyance have
alleged that they intended only to mortgage their interests. Green v.
McDade"3 is representative of the cases in which such contentions were
successfully advanced. The plaintiff, who had signed an act of cash sale
executed in authentic form, brought an action alleging slander of title
by parties whose claims were based on that instrument. The defendants
admitted the plaintiff's possession of the land in question, but denied his
ownership, and the proceeding was accordingly conducted as a petitory
action. When the defendants sought to establish their title by introducing
the act of sale signed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff objected to the admis-
sion upon contention that the instrument was obtained by fraud and error.
In particular, the plaintiff asserted that he was illiterate, that he had in-
tended not to sell but only to mortgage the property, and that the recited
cash price had not been paid. The act of sale was admitted into evidence,
and the plaintiff was permitted to give testimony concerning his conten-
tions. Although the trial judge believed that the original agreement was
intended to be a sale with the right of redemption, he concluded that
"the long silence of the plaintiff barred his right to recover." The court
of appeal, in reversing this judgment and declaring the plaintiff to be
the owner of the property, commented that the trial judge had failed to
"carry his belief to the . . . proper conclusion"2 and ruled that the
plaintiff had no burden of proving his entitlement to land he had con-
tinued to possess. Further, the opinion clearly reveals that the court be-
lieved that the defendants knew that the plaintiff contemplated only the
creation of a mortgage.
In Baker v. Baker2"5 the Louisiana Supreme Court cited the preceding
case approvingly and held testimonial evidence admissible to establish that
a party who signed an act of sale had believed he was only securing in-
debtedness. However, the purported vendee was not the party asserting
that a conveyance was intended, and he had in fact executed an act of
sale unto the purported vendor after the latter had extinguished the in-
202. See supra p. 894.
203. 17 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
204. Id. at 640.
205. 209 La. 1041, 26 So. 2d 132 (1946).
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debtedness that the original act of sale was intended to secure.2"' Accord-
ingly, this decision, like the first, has little significance for the atypical
situations in which parties truly contemplate different transactions.
Williams v. Robinson0 7 presented a situation extremely similar to the
one resolved in Green. The plaintiff in possession of land sued the defen-
dant for slander of title. The defendant, asserting that he had acquired
the plaintiff's interest, caused the proceeding to be conducted as a petitory
action. Once again, the plaintiff alleged that he had only intended to
mortgage his interest and that the act of sale bearing his signature was
obtained by fraud or error. The court, emphasizing the plaintiff's con-
tinued possession and his age and limited education, concluded that he
had sustained his contention that he had not intended to sell his interest.
Although this finding strongly suggests that the court believed that the
defendant had been aware of the plaintiff's intentions, it nonetheless stated
that the plaintiff's error alone provided basis for relief.2 0 8
In Gross v. Brooks, 09 the court indicated that rescission is available
even though the named vendee believed that a conveyance was intended.
The court first reviewed the testimony indicating the defendant's awareness
of the plaintiff's belief as to the legal significance of the document. After
concluding that the plaintiff had failed to establish misrepresentation con-
cerning the transaction, the court considered the availability of rescission
based solely upon the plaintiff's belief as to the nature of the document
in question. Citing Civil Code article 1841 and the three previously dis-
cussed cases, the plaintiff contended that his error alone entitled him to
relief. The court did not dispute this contention but carefully reviewed
the evidence in the three cases in which error was established and con-
cluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he had not intended
to convey his interest.2 1 0
Release Documents
The Louisiana jurisprudence includes numerous cases concerning the
rights of personal injury claimants who have signed release documents
describing the extinction of the claim upon which suit is based. The
claimants in these cases, of course, assert that they did not intend the
documents to affect the claims in question. A number of the decisions
address the issue in terms of error as to the nature of the contract. One
of the most significant cases is the 1963 supreme court decision in Wise
206. 209 La. at 1046-48, 26 So. 2d at 134-35. The litigation concerned the classification
of the property as a separate or a community asset.
207. 98 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957).
208. Id. at 845.
209. 130 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
210. Id. at 678-80.
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v. Prescott."' The claimant, who was over seventy years old at the time
of the accident in question, signed a release document reciting the receipt
of $150 after receiving that sum from an insurance adjustor. The signing
of the release occurred in the claimant's home less than twenty-four hours
after she was injured. The claimant and the insurance adjustor gave dif-
ferent accounts of the transaction. According to the claimant, the ad-
justor stated that the driver who had caused her injury desired to help
with medical expenses, and the adjustor assured her that this money would
have nothing to do with her legal rights. She thus asserted that she signed
the document to acknowledge receipt of money and to express her gratitude
to the driver. Additionally, she alleged that she had not been in condition
to read the document. On the other hand, the insurance adjustor asserted
that he revealed his relationship with the insurer and the insured and that
he advised the claimant that he desired to negotiate a settlement. He fur-
ther related that he believed the claimant to have read the release because
she held the document for a sufficient time for reading. However, he
did acknowledge that the entire discussion and signing was accomplished
in approximately fifteen minutes. The supreme court observed the need
"to protect persons suffering personal injuries from the possibility of error
inherent in quick releases, compromises or settlements.". 22 It then affirmed
the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiff, and in so doing it described
her error as to the nature of the contract to be reasonably based. It did
not, however, expressly find the alleged misrepresentations to have
occurred.
Wyatt v. Maryland Casualty Co. 2 3 is another decision finding a
misunderstanding as to the nature of an arrangement. The plaintiff, who
had been injured while driving his employer's truck, sued the driver of
another vehicle and the driver's insurer. The defendants, asserting that
the plaintiff's complaint had been released or compromised, filed an
exception of res judicata. Their contention was based upon the presence
of plaintiff's indorsement on a draft naming as payees the plaintiff, the
plaintiff's employer, and a body shop that had repaired the damage the
accident had caused to the truck belonging to the plaintiff's employer.
The defendant's insurer, the issuer of the draft, had written it for the
exact amount of the sum due to the body shop. The draft, on its reverse
side, contained printed language providing that indorsements would ex-
tinguish all claims of all indorsers against the insurer and its insured. The
draft had been forwarded to the plaintiff's employer, who indorsed, ob-
tained the plaintiff's indorsement, and delivered the draft to the body
shop. The plaintiff and the insurer never discussed the plaintiff's claim.
The court acknowledged that the insurer's representative desired to ob-
211. 244 La. 157, 151 So. 2d 356 (1963).
212. 244 La. at 173, 151 So. 2d at 362.
213. 160 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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tain releases from all parties concerned. However, it readily concurred
in the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff did not intend his indorse-
ment to affect his claim for personal injuries. 2
Howard v. Pan American Fire & Casualty Co.2 5 is of interest because
it analyzes the supreme court's decision in Wise and illustrates that
misunderstandings as to the nature of an arrangement seldom occur in
the absence of mispresentation. The plaintiff in Howard, like the plain-
tiff in Wise, signed a release document and subsequently asserted that
he had not intended to relinquish his claims for personal injuries. He
asserted that representations by an insurance adjustor caused him to believe
that his signature served only to initiate the payment of funds needed
for medical examination and treatment. The insurance adjustor, on the
other hand, testified that he made no such misrepresentations. The trial
judge believed the testimony of the insurance adjustor and concluded that
no misrepresentation was made concerning the terms of the release docu-
ment. After careful consideration, the court of appeal affirmed this finding.
In assessing the implications of the Wise case for the resolution of
the situation under review, the court characterized the Wise decision as
one that "rested primarily on a determination of credibility of
witnesses." 2 ' The court acknowledged that the Wise opinion directed that
rush releases be carefully scrutinized but, nonetheless, concluded that the
supreme court had not intended to foreclose the possibility of rapid set-
tlement of a personal injury claim in a situation in which the claimant
is fully aware of the significance of his actions. Further, the court did
not rest its decision solely upon the finding that misrepresentation had
not occurred; it also concluded that the plaintiff had in fact made no
"error as to the matter in dispute or the nature of the contract.".2 7
Because the cases finding error as to the nature of the contract have
identified the misunderstanding itself as the basis for refusing to recognize
contractual commitment, litigants opposing the recognition of contractual
relationships have logically asserted that their erroneous assumptions are
among those resulting in misunderstandings of this classification. As might
be imagined, not all such contentions have been successful. For instance,
in United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Singleton,218 a party sought to rescind a
compromise document prescribing the extinction of a claim that he
allegedly had not intended to extinguish. However, he readily acknowledged
that the document was intented to extinguish certain of the disputes in-
volved in the litigation. The party resisting rescission, on the other hand,
214. Id. at 386.
215. 240 So. 2d 755 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
216. Id. at 757.
217. Id. at 758.
218. 241 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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contended that its representatives had intended to extinguish the claim
in question.2"9 Further, the evidence in addition to the written document
provided a reasonable basis for believing that the claim was being
extinguished.22 The court emphasized that the only alleged error concerned
the legal effect of the document on the claim in question and readily con-
cluded that the party seeking rescission, because he knew the document
to be "a compromise of litigation," had not labored under error as to
the nature of the contract. 2 ' Accordingly, the court proceeded to define
the legal relationship in accordance with the views of the party whose
perceptions were found to be better based.
Other Contracts
The Louisiana Supreme Court identified error as to the nature of a
contract in Becker & Associates v. Lou-Ark Equipment Rentals Co.222
The controversy concerned the enforceability of an option to purchase
a piece of heavy equipment that had been leased. The parties had signed
separate lease and option documents, but neither document specified the
duration of the option. The issue, as framed by the supreme court, was
whether "the option was null and void for failure to stip ulate a time period
for the acceptance of the promise to sell." '223 The court of appeal had
reasoned that the duration of the option was limited by the duration of
the lease which, because of the absence of a provision concerning dura-
tion, was a month to month arrangement under Civil Code article 2686.
Accordingly, this court found the duration of the option to be sufficient-
ly defined. Surprisingly, the supreme court rejected this construction and
ruled that there had been but one continous lease with no provision limiting
its duration. On that basis, the court held the option provision unen-
forceable. Nonetheless, the court refused to ignore the option document
and define the relationship of the parties solely in accordance with the
terms of the lease document. 22' Further, the court's statements concerning
the availability of relief predicated upon one party's error as to the nature
of a contract225 were made in discussing the rights of a party whose percep-
tions, at least in a lay person's view, were extremely well based.
Cameron Crew Boats v. Twin Disc, Inc. ,'26 is another of the deci-
sions classifying a misunderstanding as one concerning the nature of a
219. The text of the document is reproduced in the opinion. Id. at 96-97.
220. See id. at 100.
221. Id. at 98.
222. 331 So. 2d 474 (La. 1976).
223. Id. at 477.
224. The court denied the lessor the attorney fees stipulated in the lease document and
concluded that the lessor should be compensated in the amount of the fair rental value
of the equipment for the period it was in the lessee's possession. Id. at 477-78.
225. Id. at 477.
226. 325 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
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contractual arrangement. The controversy involved the legal relationship
of a manufacturer of boat clutches and the manufacturer's distributor,
on the one hand,22 and a vessel owner who had dealt with the distributor,
on the other. The clutch on a vessel had failed, and the owner brought
the vessel to a "dealer" of the distributor. Neither the dealer nor the
distributor had the parts necessary to accomplish the needed repair.
Telephone discussions concerning the sale of a new clutch then occurred
between the distributor and the dealer. The distributor's manager testified
that he proposed to sell a new clutch at his company's cost, provided
that the vessel owner transfer the broken clutch to the distributor and
pay an additional $150 representing the cost of its repair. The vessel
owner's representative testified that he had only agreed to buy a new clutch
and that he would not have consented to the transfer of a clutch that
was still under warranty. He also testified that he expected the defective
clutch to be repaired and returned to his company. The court found that
the defective clutch had been under warranty and concluded that the vessel
owner's representative would not have traded away a fully warranted clutch
and also have paid in excess of $2000 for a replacement. The court also
found it equally apparent that the distributor did not intend to sell a new
clutch at its cost. Accordingly, the court concluded that the parties reached
no understanding as to the nature of the agreement and consequently
that no contract had been made.228
The court did not discuss the possibility of recognizing contractual
commitment in accordance with the perceptions of one of the parties as
opposed to those of the other. However, the court clearly believed that
each party had a reasonable basis for its position, and its judgment
substantially contributed toward the restoration of the vessel owner's
previous position without imposing any undue burden on the distributor.
Nonetheless, the language of the opinion identifies misunderstanding as
to the nature of a transaction, 2 9 without reference to the reasonableness




In a vast majority of the cases concerning mistaken assumptions of
contracting parties, the courts have addressed the significance of the
assumptions in terms of error as to principal cause.23 Under this con-
cept, rescission is available only when an erroneous assumption can be
227. Both were made party defendants, and judgment was rendered against them in
solido. Id. at 688.
228. Id. at 687.
229. Id.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 76-151.
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identified as the principal cause of the agreement. In determining whether
an assumption will be so classified, the courts examine the perceptions
of the party resisting rescission as well as those of the party alleging his
error to be legally significant. Further, almost all opinions assert that an
assumption is not to be classified as a principal cause unless the party
resisting rescission knew of the assumption or had a reasonable basis for
perceiving its existence. Beyond this assertion, however, the decisions con-
tain little doctrinal guidance concerning matters to be considered in prin-
cipal cause identifications. Nonetheless, an examination of the decisions
reveals several factors that clearly receive attention.
Of all the factors that have influenced decisions, disparity in the
economic exchange is probably the most important. A number of deci-
sions classify erroneous assumptions as principal causes in situations in-
volving significant disparities.23 ' Additionally, significant disparities have
also been present in other decisions decreeing rescission without reference
to the language of principal cause.232 Further, the courts, on several
occasions, have articulated a preference in "case of doubt ...in favor
of a party striving to avoid a loss against one seeking to obtain a gain.''33
However, the denial of rescission in other instances of significant disparity
clearly illustrates that other factors are considered. In particular, assump-
tions are less likely to be classified as principal causes in transactions having
a speculative element. "3 ' This is certainly the case in instances of con-
scious risk taking, and there is also indication that parties who assert that
they viewed assumptions as matters of certainty may be denied rescission
in situations in which they might more rationally have assessed the matters
in terms of probabilities.' Also, decisions that involve disparity in values
of prestations, as well as decisions that do not, indicate a judicial inclina-
tion to allocate the risk of inaccurate assumptions in accordance with the
perceptions of the party whose view, in light of all circumstances, is
thought to be better based. Thus, matters such as norms in business
practices236 and comparative expertise23 ' of contracting parties have at times
231. See, e.g., Stack v. Irwin, 246 La. 777, 167 So. 2d 363 (1964), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 86-90; Theriot v. Chaudoir, 17 La. 445 (1841), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 94-97.
232. See, e.g., Knight v. Lanfear, 7 Rob. 172 (La. 1844), discussed supra text accom-
panying notes 130-32; Tircuit v. Gottlieb, 151 So. 428 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
233. Theriot v. Chaudoir, 17 La. 445, 448 (1841); see Dorvin-Huddleston Devs. v. Con-
nolly, 285 So. 2d 359, 362 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 298 So. 2d
734 (La. 1974).
234. See Cryer v. M & M Manfacturing Co., 273 So. 2d 818 (La. 1973), discussed supra
text accompanying notes 108-19.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Walker v. Don Coleman Constr. Co., 338 So. 2d 1183 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1976), discussed supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
237. See, e.g., Ouachita Air Conditioning v. Pierce, 270 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1971), discussed supra text accompanying notes 152-59.
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received mention in principal cause identifications. Similarly, notions of
negligence or other responsibility for error have undoubtedly influenced
decisions.'
In short, the concept of principal cause allows courts to weigh all
factors that might reasonably be considered in risk allocation. Further,
the relatively few decisions addressing mistaken assumptions in terms of
error as to substance or substantial quality similarly consider these fac-
tors and reach conclusions that readily could have been expressed in terms
of error as to principal cause. 3 '
Misunderstandings
The term "misunderstanding," as used in this article, encompasses
any situation in which contracting parties have significantly different
perceptions concerning the contractual commitments or other legal conse-
quences to result from their communications." ' Thus, misunderstandings
extend from disagreements regulated as matters of contract interpretation '
to the extremely unusual situations in which parties actually contemplate
different generic contracts." ' However, the Civil Code articles concern-
ing the significance of misunderstandings are not as clear as they might
be. Accordingly, in many situations the courts may properly consider a
range of possible solutions extending from the recognition of contractual
commitment defined in accordance with the perceptions of one of the
parties to the refusal to recognize any legal consequences whatsoever. Be-
tween these extremes, the possibility exists of requiring monetary ad-
justments even in the absence of value transfers and, of course, the recogni-
tion of restitutory remedies in situations in which value transfers have
occurred. With few exceptions,24 3 the cases considered in this article have
either decreed rescission or ruled that no contractual relationship was ever
created. Further, value transfers provided the basis for all monetary
adjustments in situations in which a contractual relationship was not
recognized.2 4 '
The preponderance of cases refusing to recognize contractual com-
mitment is primarily attributable to the criteria utilized in case selection.
The decisions discussed in this article were chosen because they either refer-
red to the Civil Code articles concerning error or they cited, or were cited
238. See generally Palmer, supra note 126.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 130-51.
240. See supra text accompanying note 3.
241. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1945-1962.
242. This misunderstanding is termed "error as to the nature of the contract" in Civil
Code article 1841.
243. See, e.g., Talley v. Blake, 322 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), discussed supra
text accompanying notes 181-82.
244. See Custom Builders & Supply v. Revels, 310 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975);
North Dev. Co. v. McClure, 276 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 164-174.
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by, decisions concerning these articles. Accordingly, the misunderstandings
that have been addressed as matters of interpretation and have been re-
solved by recognition of contractual commitments have not been
discussed.2"5 Also, there has been no discussion of the cases in which the
parol evidence rule246 was found to preclude the demonstration of alleged
misunderstandings. In the overwhelming majority of the decisions refus-
ing to recognize contractual commitment, the courts have emphasized the
reasonableness of the perceptions of the party resisting the recognition.
24 7
Further, on occasion, the courts, using the language of principal cause,
have first assumed and then rescinded a contract because the party assert-
ing its existence should have known that the other party perceived a rela-
tionship with different provisions.24 8 In short, the jurisprudence provides
ample basis for the recognition of contractual commitment, despite
misunderstanding, in accordance with the perceptions of the party whose
views are found to have been better based.
Certain misunderstandings have been discussed in terms of error as
to substance. Because the Code articles concerning error of this category
indicate that reasonableness of error is not a requisite to relief,2"9 these
decisions were given particular attention. In the cases treating error as
to the identity of contractual objects as an error as to substance, the parties
who successfully resisted the recognition of contractual commitment had
reasonable bases for their perceptions.25 ° Further, in all but one of these
cases, ' misrepresentations influenced the perceptions of the complaining
party. However, the articulated rationales of these opinions are not
predicated upon the existence of reasonable assumptions, and one of the
opinions asserts that error itself, however occasioned, serves as an im-
pediment to the recognition. of contractual commitment. 52 Nonetheless,
the court advancing this contention expressed opinion that the
misunderstanding was attributable to fault of agents of the party seeking
the recognition of contractual commitment.253 Also, the cases which
describe ambiguity as to the terms of contractual commitments in terms
of error as to substance explicitly refer to the reasonableness of the percep-
tions of the parties who successfully resisted the recognition of contrac-
tual arrangements. 5 ' In sum, while the language of certain opinions
245. Civil Code articles 1945-1962 address the resolution of controversies involving in-
terpretation of contracts.
246. Civil Code article 2276 is the primary legislative basis of the jurisprudential concept.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 152-82.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 152-63.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 183-201.
251. Berard's Heirs v. Berard, 2 La. 1 (1830), discussed supra text accompanying notes
184-87, seemingly involved no misrepresentations.
252. Lawrence v. Mount Zion Baptist Church, I La. App. 404 (Orl. 1925), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 190-93.
253. Id.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 202-21.
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describes error as to substance, without restriction, as a factor precluding
contractual commitment, research has uncovered no decision in which a
party successfully asserting such error lacked reasonable basis for his
opinion.
The cases concerning error as to the nature of the contract have pro-
vided the largest number of instances in which error, apart from its
reasonableness, has been said to preclude the recognition of contractual
commitment. In three decisions involving ostensible sales, 2" purported ven-"
dors were found to have intended only to mortgage their interests, and
legal relationships were defined in accordance with their intentions.
Furthermore, one of these cases expressly states that error alone is basis
for relief, 5 6 and a fourth decision,"' in which no misunderstanding was
found, also asserts that error, apart from misrepresentation, suffices.
However, in all decisions refusing to recognize a transfer, the purported
vendor remained in possession of the property in question, and the courts
expressed belief that the purported vendee either knew or suspected that
a transfer was not intended.258
Error as to the nature of the contract has also been identified where
personal injury claimants have asserted that they were mistaken as to the
contents of release documents. Thus, the courts, without finding
misrepresentation by the party asserting a release to have been intended,
have found that the signing of unambiguous release documents did not
result in the relinquishment of claims the documents described. 59 However,
in all decisions in which the signing of documents was not regarded as
a basis for extinguishing claims, the claimant had reasonable basis for
believing that the document did not affect the claim in question. 60
Finally, several other decisions identify error as to the nature of the
contract as an occurrence precluding the recognition of contractual
commitment.2"' However, in these situations, the party resisting the recogni-
tion of the relationship also had a reasonable basis for believing that a
distinct relationship was being entered.262
In sum, the courts have described the existence of error as to substance
and error as to the nature of the contract as circumstances precluding
the recognition of contractual commitment. However, research has iden-
tified no decision in which a party successfully asserting the existence of
such error lacked reasonable basis for his perceptions.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 203-08.
256. Williams v. Robinson, 98 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957), discussed supra
text accompanying notes 207-08.
257. Gross v. Brooks, 130 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 209-10.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 203-10.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 211-21.
260. Id.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 222-29.
262. Id.
19841

